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ARTIC s 
VIRTUOUS CAPTURE 
MATTHEW WANSLEY* 
A regulatory agency is captured iJ; instead ef the public interest) it pursues the interests 
qf powerful firms it is intended to regulate. Scholars disagree about which agencies are 
capture~ how they become captured) and what reforms) if any) can prevent capture. 
There is consensus on one issue: capture is a vice. 
In this Article) I argue that capture can be a virtue. JiVhen powerful interest groups 
thwart justified regulation) the optimal strategy far pursuing that regulation may be to 
indirectfy empower interest groups that stand to profit .from it in the long-run. Legislation 
creating new interest groups-or altering the incentives ef existing ones-can develop a 
political economy that will support public-interested regulation. Currentfy dominant 
interest groups may not be able to anticipate and suppress this long-term threat to their 
power. 
This Article describes how legislation that changed the dynamics ef interest group 
power has led to regulation-on climate change) air bags) and toxic waste--that had 
been previousfy blocked by powerful industries. It offers a novel theoretical account ef why 
dominant interest groups predictabfy fail to stop legislation that empowers rival interest 
groups over time. It suggests reforms to administrative) tort) and insurance law that can 
be expected to lead to desirable) but currentfy unachievable) regulation. It defends virtuous 
capture as an empiricalfy realistic and normativefy permissible means to achieve those 
ends. 
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INTRODUCTION 
How should public-interest regulation be pursued when powerful private 
interest groups oppose it? I contend that, in some cases, the best strategy is 
to fight fire with fire. 1 
1. For most of this Article, I use "public-interested regulation" as shorthand for 
regulation that is welfare-enhancing. I briefly entertain the view that regulation should 
pursue prioritarian rather than welfarist ends in Part VI.A. I recognize that welfare-
enhancing regulation may confer disproportionate benefits on certain private interests-
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According to public choice theory, interest group influence pervades 
legislation and regulation. 2 Legislators seek reelection, and interest groups 
can provide votes and the means to acquire more votes-campaign 
contributions and expenditures. 3 But not all interest groups are equal. The 
strongest interest groups are concentrated, wealthy repeat players. Smaller 
groups have organizational advantages. 4 As each of their members has a 
large per capita stake in the group's shared interest, these groups are better 
equipped to solve collective action problems. 5 Wealthy interest groups can 
afford more influence. Repeat player interest groups acquire strategic 
knowledge and relationships and can take short-term losses for long-term 
gains. 6 
The most important of the concentrated, wealthy repeat player interest 
groups are associations of business firms. 7 Firms use their influence in the 
legislative and regulatory process for profit. They will seek regulations that 
will generate rents. 8 They can "capture" a regulatory agency by 
reorienting the agency to serve the firms' interests rather than the interests 
the agency's statute purports to protect. 9 
Scholars have differed on how democracies should respond to the 
problem of interest group influence in legislation and regulation. Some 
come close to arguing that all legislation is socially wasteful and rent-
seeking, and that we should abandon hope of regulation in the public 
interest. 10 Others claim that interest group influence is greatly exaggerated 
indeed, the Article's thesis depends on the existence of cases in which the disproportionate 
private interests of some groups and the public interest are aligned. 
2. See, e.g., DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 472-500 (2003) (describing 
theoretical models and empirical evidence on interest group activity). 
3. See George J. Stigler, The Theory ef Economic Regulation, 2 BELL]. ECON. & MGMT. 
SCI. 3, 12 (1971). 
4. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). 
5. See id. at 44. 
6. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits ef Legal 
Change, 9 L. &Soc'YREV. 95, 98-101 (1974). 
7. See generally Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories ef American Politics: 
Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. POL. 564 (2014) (providing empirical 
evidence on the substantial influence of business interest groups). 
8. See, e.g., MUELLER, supra note 2, at 333-58. 
9. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Theories ef Economic Regulation, 5 BELL]. ECON. & MGMT. 
SCI. 335, 341-42 (1974) [hereinafter Posner, Theories] (describing theories of capture). 
Posner distinguishes between various "capture" theories, including one he attributes to 
political scientists and another to economists. See id. at 341, 343. 
10. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Toward A Revitalization ef the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 703, 713-14 (1984) ("Any grant of legislative power will invite 'rent-seeking' 
behavior; each group will try to use that legislative power to expropriate the wealth of its 
rivals .... The recent growth of the interest-group theory of legislation provides powerful 
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and that taking public choice theory seriously might become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. 11 Many propose that we should adopt procedural reforms to 
reduce the opportunity for interest group influence, calling for judicial 
intervention. 12 
None of these answers are fully satisfactory. There are many regulations 
for which the best causal explanation is the rent-seeking behavior of firms 
and for which a plausible, public-interested normative defense cannot be 
offered. 13 But there are even more examples of regulations that do impose 
costs on the concentrated, wealthy repeat player interest groups and 
generate benefits to a diffuse public. 14 Therefore, neither abandoning hope 
of public-interested regulation nor ignoring the problem of interest group 
influence is justified. 
Procedural reforms have proven less fruitful than initially anticipated. 
Part of the problem is political. Proposed reforms to decrease interest 
group influence face the same challenge the reforms attempt to alleviate-
opposition from powerful interest groups. 15 By definition, these reforms 
would benefit a diffuse public, but would diminish the value of interest 
evidence of the persistence and extent of legislative abuse."). But nothing in public choice's 
positive account of legislation and regulation supports a deregulatory agenda. See Steven P. 
Croley, Themies ef Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 50 
(1998) [hereinafter Croley, Process] ("The theory's deregulatory policy reforms do not follow 
even from within its own framework. They come, rather, as something of a non sequitur."). 
11. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and 
"Empirical" Practice ef the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988). I am sympathetic 
to much of Kelman's criticisms, but I am more optimistic than he is that the positive insights 
of public choice theory can be disentangled from its early theorist's normative commitments. 
12. For proposals to use judicial review to solve public choice problems, see, for 
example, RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court 
1988 Te1m-Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43 (1989); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985). For proposals to 
use statutory interpretation instead, see, for example, William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics 
Without Romance: Implications ef Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275 
(1988); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation through Statutory Interpretation: 
An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in 
the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989). For a more exhaustive list of both, see 
Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justijj More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE LJ. 
31 (1991). 
13. For some empirical examples, see, for example, MUELLER, supra note 2, at 343-55. 
14. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIPP. FRICKEY, LAW Al""'l"D PUBLIC CHOICE 32-33 
(1991). 
15. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Judiciary and Public Choice, 50 HASTINGS LJ. 355, 355 
( claiming that the "the judicial process is more susceptible to manipulation by narrow 
interests than are the more democratic branches of government"); Elhauge, supra note 12, at 
66-87 (arguing that the litigation process is also subject to public choice problems). 
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groups with expertise in how the current system works. Part of the problem 
is conceptual. Despite many attempts, it has proven surprisingly difficult to 
articulate a theory of when interest group influence justifies judicial action 
independent of any normative assessment of the policy adopted. 16 
I offer a new answer. I argue that, under certain circumstances, rent-
seeking is not socially wasteful, and capture is not a vice. 17 In some cases, 
political actors can and should use interest groups-by altering their power 
and incentives-to pursue public-interested regulatory goals. 
Consider the case of a carbon tax. 18 It is a textbook example of a 
regulation that interest group influence would obstruct. A carbon tax 
would impose costs on the fossil fuel industry-a concentrated, wealthy, 
repeat player interest group. It would confer benefits on a diffuse public or, 
more realistically, on future generations. Attempts to enact a carbon tax 
directly, at least given the prevailing political economy in the United States 
in 2015, would fail. 
But there might be an indirect strategy: increase the influence of interest 
groups who will stand to profit from a carbon tax. We can do this through 
subsidizing clean energy firms and watching them grow into more 
powerful, influential interest groups. If the strategy works, the clean energy 
firms-for purely profit-motivated reasons-will lobby for a carbon tax and 
ultimately achieve indirectly what was not feasible directly. The clean 
energy firms' behavior in this example is undoubtedly "rent-seeking." 
Their aim would be to partially capture the legislature or regulatory agency 
for their purposes, but the outcome would be socially valuable, and the 
means may be justified. 
This hypothetical immediately raises a conceptual issue. If the fossil fuel 
16. See Elhauge, supra note 12, at 48-66 (maintaining that there is no plausible basis for 
invalidating a law on public choice grounds that is independent of one's normative position 
on the outcome). A potential third problem is doctrinal. The Supreme Court has even 
strained to avoid striking down legislation that was obviously the product of interest group 
influence and lacked a plausible public-interest rationale. See) e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical 
of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (rejecting due process and equal protection challenges to 
a state statute designed to protect the interests of optometrists). 
1 7. Others have argued that "rent-seeking" behavior may not always be socially 
wasteful. See) e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 14, at 34-35. For example, some scholars 
have argued that rent-seeking can motivate legislators to provide public goods. See Cross, 
supra note 15, at 370; see generally Tyler Cowen et al., Rent Seeking Can Promote the Provision ef 
Public Goods, 6 ECON. & POL. 131 (1994) (contending that rent-seeking can be politically 
useful under certain conditions). 
18. For an analysis of the incentives of how interest groups can be used to achieve 
public-interested climate regulation, see generally Eric Biber, Cultivating a Green Political 
Landscape: Lessons for Climate Change Poliry fi·om the Defeat ef California) s Proposition 2 3, 66 V AND. 
L. REV. 399 (2013). 
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industry can thwart the carbon tax directly, why could it not thwart the 
indirect strategy? There are three previously underappreciated reasons 
why indirect, long-term strategies might ultimately achieve public-
interested regulation that currently powerful interest groups oppose. First, 
the incentives of managers, shareholders, and lobbyists might be too 
myopic to induce firms to halt incipient long-term threats. Second, in a 
federal system, interest groups that hold power at the national level might 
not have equal influence in state or local legislatures. This creates an 
opportunity for interest groups that are weaker at the national level to 
obtain favorable legislation at subnational levels and build up a power base. 
Third, because of fiscal politics and loss aversion, there is an asymmetry 
between the influence necessary to obtain a subsidy and the influence 
necessary to obtain a tax or restrictive regulation. Interest groups that can 
obstruct taxes directed at them might not be able to obstruct subsidies that 
would benefit their opponents. 
Therefore, currently powerful interest groups may fail to thwart changes 
in interest group power and incentives that will lead indirectly to regulation 
that the groups have been able to block directly. If and when that is true, 
capture may not only be virtuous-it may also be part of the best strategy 
to achieve normatively desirable regulation. 
This Article explains how virtuous capture could work in practice, using 
the regulation of health, safety, and environmental risks as a case study. 
Risk regulation is notoriously susceptible to interest group influence. It 
confers benefits on large, diffuse groups like consumers, workers, and the 
public as a whole. It imposes costs on commercial interests within certain 
industries-concentrated, wealthy, repeat-player interest groups. Risk 
regulation can be ideologically contentious, but genuine differences in 
values do not exhaustively explain the suboptimal state of existing 
regulation. Part of the explanation is interest group power. 
Another reason why risk regulation is suited to the long-term, indirect 
virtuous capture strategy is that there are interest groups that have-or 
have the potential to have-incentives to support public-interested 
regulation for profit-seeking reasons. Within a risk-creating industry, there 
are firms that produce goods or provide services in a way that creates less 
risk than their competitors do, while other firms market products or services 
to reduce risks. These differentially risk-creating firms and risk-mitigating 
firms may stand to gain from stricter risk regulation. Outside of a regulated 
industry, there are other commercial interests with pro-regulatory 
incentives. For example, insurers have an incentive to reduce risks to their 
insureds so that the insurers pay out fewer or less costly claims. Lawyers 
have an incentive to sustain liability that will generate business. Employing 
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virtuous capture requires an understanding of these interest groups-their 
power dynamics, their incentives, and how legislation and regulation can 
change them. 
The Article proceeds in six Parts. Part I describes and critically evaluates 
public choice theory's account of interest group influence over legislation 
and regulation. Part II considers how interest group power changes over 
time and explains why currently powerful interest groups will not always be 
able to anticipate or thwart long-term threats to their power. Parts III-V 
analyze interest groups with potentially pro-regulatory incentives-
industry, insurers, and lawyers-with the aim of generating specific 
suggestions for how they should be empowered and how their incentives 
should be altered. Part VI offers a normative defense of the strategy of 
virtuous capture, both its ends and its means. 
I. INTEREST GROUP POWER OVER LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 
Public choice theory provides a positive account of legislation and 
regulation. 19 It has been subject to exhaustive and powerful conceptual 
and empirical criticisms. The aim of this Part is to synthesize the insights of 
public choice theorists and their critics to arrive at a working conception of 
interest group influence over legislation and regulation that is empirically 
realistic. 
A. Public Choice 77zeory 
Public choice uses neoclassical microeconomic theory's rational actor 
model to generate its positive account of political actors and institutions. 2o 
According to the rational actor model, individuals aim to maximize their 
utility within the constraints they face. 21 Collective action will occur when 
it is in the interest of individual actors. 22 Institutions reflect the incentives 
19. Throughout the Article, I use the phrases "public choice" and "public choice 
theory" to refer generally to research in economics, political science, and law that applies the 
rational actor model to analyze the behavior of political actors and the structure of political 
institutions. The main cost of this simplified approach is that I ignore the rich variety of 
differing public choice models. The main benefit is that I can off er suggestions about the 
best legal strategies to use public choice dynamics to advance public-interested regulation. A 
more comprehensive defense of any particular strategy would require a more sophisticated 
account of the relevant actors, institutions, and incentives. 
20. See Posner, 1heories, supra note 9, at 343. 
21. For a basic introduction to the rational actor model as it is applied to law, see 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-21 (6th ed. 2003) [hereinafter 
POSNER, At~ALYSIS]. 
22. For an exhaustive list of the reasons why public choice predicts collective action will 
occur, see MUELLER, supra note 2, at 9-63. 
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of the individual actors. 
The public choice theory of legislation starts with the assumption that 
legislators are motivated to maximize their chances of reelection. 23 If a 
legislator prioritizes some goals other than reelection, that legislator will be 
outcompeted in the next cycle by another candidate who more single-
mindedly pursues election. To increase their chances of reelection, 
legislators seek votes and, because obtaining votes requires funding costly 
political campaigns, campaign contributions and expenditures. 24 Thus, 
they will be most responsive to the interest groups that can provide the 
most votes and campaign funds. 25 In exchange, legislators can offer their 
support for or opposition to legislation in which those groups have an 
interest. 26 Thus, 'just as managers of firms are hired to further the interests 
of owners, so too are politicians and bureaucrats assumed to be hired to 
further the collective interests of pressure groups, who fire or repudiate 
them by elections and impeachment when they deviate excessively from 
these interests." 27 
Public choice theorists have posited similar accounts of the regulatory 
process, in which regulators are agents for their legislator principals. 28 In 
one model, through the mechanism of administrative procedures, "political 
actors stack the deck in favor of constituents who are the intended 
beneficiaries of the bargain struck by the coalition which created the 
agency." 29 Another model starts with a focus on the agents-regulators-
and reasons that they seek to maximize their agency budgets. 30 On this 
model, legislators are able to partially control the behavior of regulators 
because they hold the purse strings. 31 These models converge on the 
following result: the same interest groups that have influence over 
23. See id. at 475. 
24. See Stigler, supra note 3, at 12. 
25. See id. at 11-13. 
26. See id. at 9-11. 
27. Gary S. Becker, A Theory ef Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Irifluence, 98 
QJ. ECON. 371, 396 (1983). For a public choice account oflegislation that assigns agency to 
legislators rather than interest groups, see generally FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR 
NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997). 
28. See generally Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments ef 
Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987). The co-authors of this article and a series 
of related articles are often known as "McNollgast." For a critique, see JERRY L. MASHAW, 
GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 118-23 (1997). For an alternative model, see Matthew 
C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control ef the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53 (2008). 
29. McCubbins et al., supra note 28, at 261 (emphasis omitted). 
30. See MUELLER, supra note 2, at 362-68. 
31. See id. at 367-68. 
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legislators will have influence over regulators. 
Which interest groups will be able to provide the most votes and money 
to influence politicians? The fundamental, counterintuitive insight of 
public choice theory is that smaller, concentrated groups have systematic 
advantages over larger, diffused groups in solving the type of collective 
action problems that political influence necessitates. 32 In large groups, each 
individual member's per capita stake is small relative to the interest of the 
group as a whole, so each member has the incentive to free ride. 33 In 
smaller groups, however, each individual member has a greater per-capita 
stake and a lesser propensity to free ride. 
Smaller groups have other predictable advantages in solving collective 
action problems. They can more easily monitor the contributions of 
individual members, making it more difficult for members to shirk their 
responsibilities. 34 With fewer members, it is also more likely that a small 
group will arrive at an agreement about how to pursue its aims. 35 
Concentrated groups are more efficient at organizing because their small 
size reduces "the costs of communication among group members, the costs 
of any bargaining among them, and the costs of creating, staffing, and 
maintaining any formal group organization." 36 It is possible that, because 
individual members of small groups are more likely to interact with each 
other, small groups have better "social incentives" as well. 37 
These large, diffuse groups that are at a relative disadvantage can be 
consumers, workers, and the public as a whole. 38 Thus, "the laboring, 
professional, and agricultural interests of the country make up large, latent 
groups that can organize and act effectively only when their latent power is 
crystallized by some organization which can provide political power as a 
by-product" of other benefits like trammg, networking, or legal 
representation. 39 Conversely, "business interests generally can voluntarily 
and directly organize and act to further their common interests without any 
32. See OLSON, supra note 4, at 43-44. For an extension of Olson's analysis explaining 
political organization as an extension of the theory of the firm, see Jonathan R. Macey, 
Public Choice: 17ze Themy ef tlze Firm and the Theory ef .Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 
45-51 (1988). 
33. See OLSON, supra note 4, at 44. 
34. See Elhauge, supra note 12, at 38-39. 
35. See OLSON, supra note 4, at 46; see also Posner, Theories, supra note 9, at 345. 
36. OLSON, supra note 4, at 47; see also Posner, Theories, supra note 9, at 345. 
37. See OLSON, supra note 4, at 62-63. 
38. See Elhauge, supra note 12, at 40 ("One might think of 'the general public' as the 
collection of all groups too small (such as the typical family) or too large (such as consumers) 
to form effective interest groups."). 
39. See OLSON, supra note 4, at 143. 
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such adventitious assistance. " 40 
The set of businesses in any particular industry are the archetypal small, 
but powerful, concentrated interest groups. According to one public choice 
theorist, "The high degree of organization of business interests, and [their] 
power ... must be due in large part to the fact that the business community 
is divided into a series of (generally oligopolistic) 'industries,' each of which 
contains only a fairly small number of firms." 41 One interesting and useful 
prediction of public choice theory is that the business community as a 
whole, which is a much larger group than the set of firms in an individual 
industry, will have relatively less influence than industry-specific business 
groups. 42 
Another factor that affects interest group power-identified by sociology 
rather than economics, but consistent with the public choice account-is 
whether the interest group is a repeat player. 43 In any legislative, 
regulatory, or litigation process, agents that participate in repeated rounds 
of competition will have strategic advantages. They can acquire specialized 
knowledge about how to optimize their chances of success within the 
process. 44 They can benefit from economies of scale and, by paying fixed 
costs upfront, have low start-up costs for any individual legislative or 
regulatory battle. 45 They cultivate relationships with the relevant 
decisionmakers. 46 Most importantly, they will be more willing to take 
short-term losses that will accrue long-term benefits-they can "play for 
rules." 47 In most regulatory contexts, the regulated industry exemplifies the 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. See id. at 145-46. 
43. See general?J Galanter, supra note 6. Although Galanter is not a public choice theorist 
and his article is focused on litigation rather than legislation and regulation, many of the 
basic arguments he offers to demonstrate why certain groups have advantages in litigation 
plausibly apply to legislation and regulation as well. In fact, Galanter appears to suggest that 
he focused on litigation in part because he takes it as obvious that powerful interest groups 
predominate in legislative and regulatory processes. See id. at 135 ("The various kinds of 
'have-nots' ... have fewer resources to accomplish changes through legislation or 
administrative policy-making. The advantages of the organized, professional, wealthy and 
attentive in these forums are well-known. Litigation, on the other hand, has a flavor of 
equality."); see also Richard Lempert, Comment, A Classic at 25: Refl,ections on Galanter's 
"Haves" Article and the Wmk It Has Inspired, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 1099, 1111 (1999) ("I expect 
that the 'haves' have advanced their interests more through influencing legislation than 
through playing the litigation game for precedent."). 
44. See Galanter, supra note 6, at 98. 
45. See id. 
46. See id. at 99. 
47. Id.at99-100. 
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repeat player. 
Public choice theory predicts that regulated firms will use their political 
power to increase their profits in three ways. First, they will seek legislation 
or regulation that provides subsidies. 48 Subsidies could be direct, but they 
usually take the form of a tax credit or deduction. Second, incumbent firms 
will seek statutes and rules that create barriers to new firms entering the 
market. 49 Possible examples are licensing and permitting schemes, 
education and training requirements, or bonding and insurance mandates. 
Third, firms will seek policies that will advantage products or services that 
are complements to what they sell and that will disadvantage substitutes. 50 
Many of these benefits are economic rents-payments in excess of the 
market value of an asset. 51 Thus, public choice theorists refer to firms' 
"rent-seeking" behavior. 52 Some have claimed that much of what we take 
to be public-interested regulation actually reflects rent-seeking. 53 If firms 
are successful, an agency may become "captured" by the firms it regulates, 
and the captured agency will use its regulatory power to generate economic 
rents for the incumbent firms in an industry. 54 
B. Critiques ef the Public Choice Account 
Critics have raised three types of objections to the public choice account 
of legislation and regulation: ( l) the behavioral assumptions of the rational 
actor model are false, especially in the ideologically-charged world of 
political action; 55 (2) the public choice account of interest groups does not 
generate determinate predictions; 56 and (3) to the extent that public choice 
theory does yield determinate predictions, the empirical evidence is 
mixed. 57 
The criticism of public choice theory's behavioral assumptions is familiar 
from criticisms of the rational actor model in legal scholarship. 58 
48. See Stigler, supra note 3, at 4-5; see also Becker, supra note 27, at 380. 
49. See Stigler, supra note 3, at 5. 
50. Id. at 6. 
51. For an explanation of the concept, see POSNER, ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 9-10. 
52. For a brief discussion of how public choice theorists use the phrase, see MUELLER, 
supra note 2, at 333-35. 
53. For estimates of the social welfare losses from rent-seeking, see id. at 355-58. 
54. See, e.g., Posner, 17zeories, supra note 9, at 341-42. 
55. See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 14, at 24-27. 
56. See, e.g., Posner, 17zeories, supra note 9, at 34 7-49; MASHAW, supra note 28, at 35-37. 
57. See, e.g.,FARBER&FRICKEY,supranote 14,at27-32. 
58. For an introduction, see generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 14 71 (1998) (summarizing criticisms of the rational actor 
model). 
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Behavioral law and economics scholars have drawn attention to the 
predictable ways in which observed behavior diverges from the rational 
actor model due to bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded 
self-interest. 59 In the context of political action, the behavioral critique 
might be even stronger. Individuals with strong ideological motivations 
might self-select into political activity. Social norms might make ideological 
reasons for action salient or stigmatize acting as if political decisions were 
market transactions. 
Even if legislators are largely self-interested and rational, they may not 
have as much need to maximize their chances of reelection as some public 
choice theorists assume. 60 Due to geography and gerrymandering, most 
legislative districts are safe and incumbent turnover is rare, so legislators 
may have less demand for interest group contributions and expenditures 
than public choice theory suggests. 61 
The standard response to criticisms of the microeconomic rational actor 
model is that the theory should be judged by its predictions, not by its 
assumptions. 62 Any model of human behavior will necessarily make 
simplifying assumptions, so the rational actor model may be a useful model 
of human behavior in spite of its false assumptions. In the context of public 
choice theory, proponents of the rational actor model argue that it has 
more explanatory power than the "public interest" theory of legislation and 
regulation that had prevailed before the rise of public choice. 63 In other 
words, it takes a theory to beat a theory, and public choice theory may be 
comparatively more accurate. 
But if public choice theorists wish the theory to be judged on its 
predictions, they only highlight the importance of the critics' arguments 
that the theory does not generate determinate predictions. One common 
criticism is that there are obvious benefits, consistent with the rational actor 
model, to large groups. Larger groups have more potential voters. 64 They 
also have more potential donors. 65 Even if a greater percentage of those 
large group voters or donors are more likely to free ride than voters and 
59. See id. at 14 77-79. 
60. See Croley, Process, supra note 10, at 43. 
61. See id. (citing to empirical evidence). 
62. See, e.g., POSNER, ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 17-18. 
63. More recent variants of "public interest" theory may be less susceptible to the 
public choice critique. See Croley, Process, supra note 10, at 65-76 (describing and critically 
assessing the positive claims of public interest theory). 
64. See MASHAW, supra note 28, at 34. 
65. Steven Croley, Interest Groups and Public Choice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC 
CHOICE Al"l"D PUBLIC LAW 49, 61 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010). 
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donors in small groups, the sheer size of the group may counterbalance the 
greater tendency to free ride. Public choice theory does not contend that 
the smallest possible group-an individual-will dominate. Instead, it 
predicts that "intermediate" groups will win out. 66 To the critics, this 
suggests that all public choice theory has accomplished is to point out the 
tradeoffs that group size creates for political organization. What the 
optimal group size would be is indeterminate. Consequently, when a law 
or rule might benefit one industry over another, it is difficult to know which 
industry public choice theory predicts will prevail. 67 
In some cases, public choice scholars disagree among themselves about 
what the theory predicts. For example, "some imagine that interest group 
bargains will be set out in quite specific terms in order to assure that value is 
actually received by the interest group for its contribution of either monies 
or votes." 68 Conversely, "others predict that interest group legislation will 
be vague in form and contain broad delegations of authority to 
administrative personnel." 69 
This criticism has its limits. Public choice theory clearly predicts that 
legislation and regulation benefiting the public as a whole and imposing 
costs on smaller groups will be less likely to succeed than laws and rules that 
benefit a small interest at the public's expense. Yet even that type of 
legislation may be difficult to identify because, as one critic puts it, 
"virtually any individual piece of legislation will generate both a plausible 
private-interest and a plausible public-interest explanation." 70 
It is perhaps unsurprising that, given these conceptual issues, the 
empirical evidence for public choice theory is thin. 71 Even back when 
Judge Posner was a more thoroughgoing enthusiast of the rational actor 
model, he was skeptical of the empirical evidence for public choice. 72 The 
theory struggles to explain the mundane observation that some part of the 
electorate does turn out to vote in the absence of an obvious self-interested 
reason to do so, without recourse to the unenlightening assumption that 
some individuals have a "taste" for political activity. 73 Econometric studies 
attempting to test public choice theories have produced mixed results. 74 
Empirical case studies of particular legislation have concluded that interest 
66. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 4, at 53-54. 
67. See Posner, Theories, supra note 9, at 34 7-49. 
68. See MASHAW, supra note 28, at 35. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 37. 
71. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 14, at 17-22. 
72. See Posner, 77zeories, supra note 9, at 350-56. 
73. See FARBER & FRlCKEY, supra note 14, at 24-27; MASHAW, supra note 28, at 35-36. 
74. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 14, at 27-29. 
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group power did not explain the outcome in those cases. 75 Research on roll 
call votes finds that ideology, rather than interest group influence, predicts 
legislator behavior. 76 
But the relative dearth of empirical evidence supporting public choice 
theory does not decisively refute its claims. Legislators and regulators 
almost certainly have stronger self-interested reasons preventing them from 
simply acting on their ideological preferences that voters do. In addition, 
roll call votes might not tell us much about the underlying interest group 
influence buried in the details of legislation. One sympathetic critic of 
public choice theory has explained, "It is quite easy to concoct 
environmental legislation, for example, that is special interest in nature. 
But to see that it is, one must inspect the specifics of the legislation rather 
than focusing simply on the fact that ... a clean water bill got passed." 77 
One assessment of public choice theory concluded, "A less grandiose 
version ... would simply postulate ( 1) that reelection is an important 
motive of legislators, (2) that constituent and contributor interests thereby 
influence legislators, and (3) that small, easily organized interest groups 
have an influence disproportionate to the size of their membership." 78 This 
more modest version of public choice theory is plausible under existing 
evidence and can serve as a working conception of interest group influence 
over legislation and regulation. But, to be useful for generating 
prescriptions, the working conception needs to explain how and when 
interest group power can change. 
IL THE LIMITS OF INTEREST GROUP POWER OVER TIME 
Interest group power is dynamic. According to public choice theory, an 
industry's capacity to organize and influence politics depends on its size, 
wealth, and concentration. Such factors in turn depend on the state of 
technology, trade, and consumer preferences at any particular time. As the 
economy evolves, there will be residual effects on the political power of 
commercial interest groups. 
The mere fact that interest group power can change, though, does not 
have significant consequences for political strategy. If the causes of change 
in interest group power were always exogenous to the political process, 
their relevance would be limited to the question of when certain political 
goals would become more or less viable. But some changes in the size, 
75. See id. at 32-33; see also MASHAW, supra note 28, at 32-34. 
76. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 14, at 29-32. 
77. See MASHAW, supra note 28, at 39. 
78. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 14, at 33. 
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wealth, and concentration of interest groups are endogenous to the political 
process. Legislation and regulation can be causes of, just as much as they 
are products of, interest group power. 
In fact, public choice theory itself gives reasons to suggest how 
legislation and regulation might produce changes in interest group power. 
Consider the main aims that public choice theory attributes to interest 
groups representing the firms in one industry. As Part I explained, 
incumbent firm interest groups are predicted to seek subsidies, barriers to 
entry, advantages for complementary goods, and disadvantages for 
substitute goods. 79 Public choice theory explains that firms pursue these 
aims for economic, rather than political, reasons. 80 They will profit directly 
from subsidies, retain market share by imposing barriers to entry, and gain 
new consumers if the consumption of complementary goods increases or 
the consumption of substitute goods decreases. 
But each of these economic benefits also has the potential to create 
political effects as well. Subsidies will make an industry wealthier and 
thereby enable it to afford more influence. Yet, they also might cause the 
industry to lose some of its organizational advantages if new firms enter the 
market and increase the size of the group. Creating barriers to entry 
reduces the chance that new firms will dilute the organizational power of 
the industry, but it also might reduce the growth of the industry. Altering 
the size of markets for complementary and substitute goods will affect the 
size, organization, and power of potential ally or adversary interest groups. 
These political effects will generally be the byproducts of an interest group's 
pursuit of legislation and regulation, but they could be motivations for 
political behavior as well, if firm interest groups were fully rational actors 
attempting to sustain or accumulate power over time. 
The potential for legislation and regulation to alter the power of interest 
groups raises the possibility that political actors could enact legislation or 
pursue regulation that would reduce the power of currently dominant 
interest groups. But that possibility can only be realized if, contrary to 
expectations, the dominant interest groups fail to block legislation that 
poses a threat to their power. 
This Part offers three reasons why currently powerful interest groups 
might not be able to thwart legislation that would reduce their power. 
First, the incentives of individual decisionmakers within an interest group or 
of the group's agents might encourage myopic decisionmaking. Second, in 
a federal system, a nationally dominant interest group might not have 
79. See Stigler, supra note 3, at 4-6. 
80. See id. at 4 (claiming that an industry is motivated to seek regulation "to increase its 
profitability"). 
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sufficient influence over the state or local government that enacts 
unfavorable legislation. Third, for a variety of reasons, there are political 
asymmetries between subsidies and restrictive regulation, so groups that can 
block restrictions may not be able to block subsidies. 
A. Myopic Incentives 
Public choice theory emphasizes that the power of interest groups 
depends on the incentives of their members. For business interests, the 
theory takes the firm as its unit of analysis. 81 But just as the behavior of a 
business association depends on the incentives of individual firms, the 
behavior of a firm depends on the incentives of the managers that make its 
decisions, the shareholders who create incentives for managers, and the 
lobbyists that carry out the decisions managers make. As corporate law 
scholars have long recognized, the incentives of each of these individuals 
may diverge from the long-run interests of the firm. 82 
The main constraint on a firm's incentive to protect its long-term interest 
is the discontinuity of the individual actors that make its decisions. 83 
Managers have limited tenures. While they internalize the benefits and 
costs of the short-term performance of the firm, they only internalize an 
attenuated portion of its long-term performance. After managers leave, it 
can be difficult to disentangle the causal effects of their decisions from the 
effects of subsequent managers. Even where the causal responsibility is 
traceable, the firm will find it difficult to monitor and sanction managers 
based on the expected effects their decisions will have on long-term 
performance at the time those decisions are being made. Monitoring 
would require a monitor who will internalize the future costs and benefits of 
81. See) e.g., OLSON, supra note 4, at 9. 
82. See) e.g., 1 JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS§ 2:7 (3d ed. 2014) ("The separation of ownership from control gives rise to 
various conflicts of interest between passive owners and active managers. In the abstract, 
managers are no different from other individuals when facing an economic choice; so as to 
maximize their own utility, they can be expected to act like other individuals in exercising 
discretionary decisions. Utility maximization is an especially interesting problem in the 
public corporation, where management and ownership are separated. The managers' quest 
to maximize their utility does not naturally lead to decisions that also maximize the value of 
the firm."). See also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory ef Corporate 
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 265-76 (1999); Michael C.Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory 
ef the Fi1m.: Managerial Behavim~ Agenry Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-11 
(1976); Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Fi1m. in Law and Economics, 18]. CORP. L. 301, 312-14 
(1993). 
83. Cf PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME 120 (2004) (explaining the importance of 
actor discontinuity to long-term institutional dynamics). 
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the monitoring and have the power to act at the time the manager needs to 
be monitored. M Sanctioning would require some mechanism for the firm 
to have power over a manager after the manager leaves the firm. 85 For 
these reasons, managers will have short time horizons, and to some extent 
the firm's decisions will reflect those horizons. 
Firms have some means to lengthen the time horizons of managers. 
After all, one standard justification for corporate law is to more closely align 
the interests of managers with the interest of shareholders. 86 At least in 
theory, shareholders can elect and replace corporate directors to ensure 
that managers protect shareholder interests. 87 But, while corporate law 
controls might prevent managers from making some self-serving decisions, 
they may only extend managers' time horizons to the time horizon of the 
median shareholder. Shareholders have no incentive to ensure that 
corporate boards and, in turn, managers, make decisions that will advance 
the firm's interest after the shareholder sells the stock. 88 
Due to the myopic incentives of shareholders and managers, firm 
decisions may discount the firm's long-term future interests more greatly 
than a unitary, continuous rational actor would. Therefore, the firm's 
political decisions may place less value on preventing long-term threats to 
the firm's political power. 
In fact, in the context of political activity, there is a further layer of 
84. Cf id. at 114 (explaining the difficulty of monitoring). 
85. q. id. ( explaining the difficulty of sanctioning). 
86. See, e.g., Cox & HAZEN, supra note 82, at § 2:7 ("A key point in the neoclassical 
economic view of the firm is that managers must have an incentive compensation 
arrangement that substantially ties their fortunes to that of the owners."); Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 850 (2005) ("In 
publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership, the interests of management do not 
fully overlap with those of shareholders, and management thus cannot be automatically 
counted on to take actions that would serve shareholder interests. As a result, agency costs 
that reduce shareholder value might arise."). But see Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects ef 
Shareholder Primary, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2003, 2010 (2013) (contending that "modern 
academics [have] long viewed as the core problem of corporate law ... the agency cost 
problem of self-interested managers exploiting powerless shareholders" and critiquing that 
view). 
87. But see Bebchuk, supra note 86, at 851-61 (explaining the limits of shareholder 
power to elect and replace directors). 
88. See, e.g., Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New fiystem qf C01porate Governance: 
17ze Qy,inquennial Election if Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 205-13 (1991) (listing reasons for 
short-term bias in shareholders); see generall:J Kent Greenfield, The Puzzle ef Slzort-Tennism, 46 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627 (2011) (arguing that short-term-oriented investors collude with 
short-term-oriented management to externalize long-term costs). But see Bernard S. Black, 
Agents Watching Agents: The Promise ef Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 862 
( 1992) ( claiming that "the available evidence strongly suggests that institutional investors are 
not {YStematicall:J myopic") (emphasis in original). 
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myopia. Managers generally do not engage in political activity directly. 
Instead, a firm or a business association will retain lobbyists to implement 
its legislative and regulatory agenda. Lobbyists are imperfect agents for 
their firm or business association principals. 89 To the extent that managers 
are able to control lobbyist behavior, lobbyists' decisions will reflect the 
firms' myopic incentives. But because lobbyists also have limited tenures, 
lobbying firms add their own problems of actor discontinuity, imperfect 
monitoring, and imperfect sanctioning as well. Therefore, lobbyists will 
have the incentive to produce tangible short-term results for their clients, 
like seeking rents or halting regulation that would diminish rents. Lobbyists 
may not be able to demonstrate the value of efforts to prevent long-term 
erosion of the firm's or the industry's political power. 
Lobbyists' incentives may also diverge from the interests of incumbent 
firms. If a lobbyist's skills are based on interactions with a particular 
regulatory agency and an associated Congressional committee, they might 
not have much incentive to ensure that incumbent firms preserve their 
position in an industry. As long as some wealthy potential clients will have 
an interest in the skills of a lobbyist who has relationships with regulators 
and legislators, the lobbyist will expect gainful employment. Thus, a 
change in regulation that shuffles the composition of the industry may not 
be as threatening to a lobbyist as it would be to the firms that the lobbyist 
represents. 
This analysis of the myopic incentives of lobbyists is analogous in some 
respects to the "revolving door" metaphor that critics of the existing 
structure of regulatory agencies often raise. 90 These critics worry that 
agency officials will subtly serve the interests of industry while working at 
the agency, with the expectation that doing so will secure them lucrative 
employment after they leave government service. 91 Lobbyists may have 
parallel incentives to serve the interests of their future employers. If they 
believe that a regulatory reform will affect those who will benefit from 
relationships with the regulatory agency in the future, lobbyists may start to 
subtly serve the interests of their prospective employers, rather than their 
current ones. 
Therefore, lobbyists, like managers and shareholders, will not always 
have an incentive to pursue the long-term interests of the firms that employ 
89. For a more general discussion of the principal-agent problems between lobbyists 
and their clients, see generally Matthew C. Stephenson & Howell E. Jackson, Lobbyists as 
ImjJe1fictAgents: Implicationsfor Public Policy in a Pluralist System, 47 HARV.]. ON LEGIS. 1 (2010). 
90. For a recent summary and critique of these arguments, see David Zaring, Against 
Being Against the Revolving Door, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 507, 512-22(2013). 
91. See id. at 512-16. 
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them. If a threat to a firm's or a business association's interest group power 
develops over several years or decades, the incumbents may not invest 
resources in responding to it. Those myopic incentives create the 
opportunity for deliberate strategies to alter interest group power. 
B. Federalism 
The federal system has long played a role in the dynamics of interest 
group power in the United States. For example, in 1886, Congress enacted 
the Margarine Tax Act, one of "the first instances of federal legislation in 
which one domestic industry sought to enlist the government's coercive 
power to stamp out competition from another domestic industry."92 How 
did the dairy industry develop the power to persuade Congress that it ought 
to protect butter from margarine? The dairy industry started with state 
legislatures, where the cost of organizing was lower and the smaller number 
of individual firms in the state made it easier to overcome free-rider 
problems. 93 It focused on states like New York, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, 
and Vermont, where dairy production was concentrated. 94 Over time, the 
dairy industry successfully obtained legislation prohibiting margarine in the 
leading dairy states. 95 
But after a state judicial decision rolled back New York's statute, the 
dairy industry began to organize at the federal level. 96 A national industry 
group, which was a successor to New York's organization, developed a plan 
for federal legislation. 97 The bill "drew on prior state legislation, borrowing 
those features that had been successful and scrapping the parts that had 
proved ineffective."98 Its leading supporters were representatives from New 
York and other dairy states, and state dairy organizations lobbied for its 
passage. 99 President Grover Cleveland signed the bill into law, even though 
he personally recognized that it was largely the product of interest group 
power. 100 
The situation of the dairy industry in the 1880s differs from that of the 
interest groups with pro-regulatory incentives discussed here in a critical 
92. Geoffrey P. Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn ef the Special Interest State: 17ze Story r!fButter 
and Margarine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 83, 126-27 (1989). 
93. See id. at 98. 
94. See id. at 103. 
95. Id. at 113. 
96. See id. at 117-18; see also People v. Marx, 2 N.E. 29 (N.Y. 1885) (acknowledging the 
interest group politics behind dairy protectionism). 
97. See Miller, supra note 92, at 120. 
98. Id. at 121. 
99. See id. at 122. 
100. See id. at 126. 
438 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW [67:3 
way: it was not an upstart seeking to challenge powerful interests. Rather, 
it was an incumbent seeking to halt the rise of a new entrant, margarine. 
But the history of the Margarine Tax Act illustrates how federalism allows 
interest groups to gradually build up power over time in state legislatures 
and to use that power at the federal level when the timing is auspicious. 
This pathway to interest group power is a systematic feature of a federal 
system. In a unitary system of government, legislation and regulation must 
pass through a limited set of veto bottlenecks, which creates a smaller 
number of targets for political influence. A federal system like the United 
States introduces a multitude of state and local legislators that can enact 
favorable statutes and a multitude of state and local regulators that can 
promulgate rules. If these legislators and regulators respond differentially 
to influence from diverse interest groups or if national interest groups fail to 
exercise their influence at the state and local level, the interests that 
dominate the federal government might not dominate state and local 
governments. 101 There are four reasons why either one of those conditions 
might be true. 
First, because political influence is often acquired through gradually 
developing relationships with decisionmakers, the interest groups with the 
most power in a particular legislature or regulatory agency will generally be 
those with ongoing interests-the repeat players. 102 There may be high 
initial fixed costs to investing in influence in one government-retaining 
lobbyists and lawyers that can provide contributions, expenditures, and 
connections to officials-and then smaller marginal costs to exercising that 
influence on an individual bill or proposed rule. 103 The high fixed costs of 
organizing may be recuperated ~ver the course of repeated interactions. 
Consequently, national interest groups that rarely have a stake in the 
outcomes of legislative and regulatory processes in state or local 
governments may not pay the initial fixed costs to acquire influence in those 
arenas. Thus, even if they do monitor the actions of state and local 
governments, when interest groups find that unfavorable legislation or 
regulation has been proposed in those governments, it may be too late to 
101. Cf Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National 
Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 23 (2007) (arguing that states "are captured by a 
different set of interests than those dominant in Washington, D.C., because state 
constituencies contain a different mix of interests than the nation as a whole"). 
102. See Galanter, supra note 6, at 98-99. 
103. Cf OLSON, supra note 4, at 22 (explaining that there will be significant fixed costs to 
acquiring collective goods in "virtually all cases"). Olson's point is about the cost of 
organizing generally, but it could be equally true of organizing in a new jurisdiction. 
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develop the relationships that can affect its chances. 104 Because acquiring 
influence in all state and local governments would be too costly, national 
interest groups might invest only where they can reasonably predict 
unfavorable legislation, but those may be the governments least susceptible 
to their influence. 
The expenses national interest groups face in organizing at the state and 
local level must be balanced against the lower cost of influence at those 
levels. Yet although state and local legislative campaigns generally cost 
much less to run than federal campaigns, even the smaller cost of 
organizing at subnational levels might not appear worthwhile to firms if, 
unlike at the federal level, there is no short-term threat of legislation or 
regulation. 
Second, many interest groups, especially business associations, rely 
heavily on their capacity to employ voters for political influence, and 
employment is geographically concentrated. 105 The connection between 
providing employment and gaining influence works in two ways. It can 
provide a sincere reason for voters and the politicians who represent them 
to support an industry's agenda. The voters that an industry employs and 
the voters who benefit from an industry's spillover effects on the local 
economy will be inclined to support policies that keep those jobs available. 
Legislators will respond to those pressures and also might independently 
value keeping those jobs with their constituents. An industry's capacity to 
employ might also work in a more subtle way as a pretext. A legislator can 
accept contributions from an industry and justify taking that money on the 
ground that they support the industry because it is a local employer. 
At the federal level, a mobile industry can maximize its influence by 
employing voters in as many districts as possible. It can also economize on 
influence by employing voters in the districts of the relevant committee 
members. 106 At the state and local level, the prospects for influence 
104. Garrick Pursley and Hannah Wiseman argue that local governments, as opposed to 
state or federal governments, may be able to enact policies adverse to utility lobbies because 
those groups need to rely "on 'fire alarm' rather than 'police patrol' monitoring of regulatory 
activity to alert them to initiatives on which their interests require intervention." Garrick B. 
Pursley & Hannah]. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORYLJ. 877,928 (2011) (citing Mathew 
D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire 
Alanns, 28 AM.j. POL. SCI. 165 (1984)). 
105. CJ. Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 
63, 89 (1990) ("The cigarette manufacturing lobby has the same right to operate in 
Massachusetts as in North Carolina. If lobbying dominated legislative choices, we would 
expect the tobacco lobby to have as much success with a senator from Massachusetts as with 
a senator from North Carolina."). 
106. There is empirical evidence that the constituencies of committee members receive 
disproportionate benefits from legislation passed through those committees and that firms 
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through employment are more daunting. For all but the most dispersed 
industries, there are simply too many states and localities to influence. So, 
in some state and local legislatures, industries will lack the employment-
based influence they possess nationally, and legislators will lack the political 
cover that the job creation argument provides. 
Third, there is a political stigma to accepting out-of-state money in 
political campaigns. 107 Candidates can and do highlight outside interest 
groups funding their opponent's campaigns. For this reason, state and local 
legislators may be more willing to accept contributions from interests within 
their jurisdictions, even if national interest groups can outspend them. Of 
course, this point hinges on the transparency of campaign finance. If 
national groups can cloak their influence, state and local legislators may be 
able to avoid the stigma and be susceptible to influence. 
Fourth, the ideological divergence between state or local electorates and 
the national electorate could constrain the power of national interest groups 
in some subnational legislatures. Some ideologically salient industries, like 
firearms, are welcomed in rural counties and loathed in cities or vice versa. 
Others, like tobacco, are more unpopular in states in certain regions of the 
country than others. Even less controversial industries might find some 
state legislatures less accommodating because those states are more broadly 
supportive of regulating industry. The differences in state and local 
preferences might not be limited to the left-right divide. Some jurisdictions, 
for example, have political cultures that favor innovation and start-ups, 
while others pref er to protect established firms. To the extent that these 
ideological constraints limit the political viability of particular legislation or 
simply limit legislators' willingness to accept contributions from or 
cooperate with certain interest groups, nationally powerful interest groups 
might not have equivalent power in state and local governments. 
For these reasons, interest groups that are disfavored at the federal level 
can use their power in state or local legislatures-and the rents it can 
provide-to build up a rival power base and grow. Eventually, they may 
be able to challenge the balance of the power at the federal level as well. 
One could object that national interest groups can solve all of these 
federalism problems through preemption. Thanks to the Supremacy 
target their political contributions accordingly. See, e.g., Barry R. Weingast & William J. 
Marshall, The Industrial 01ganization ef Congress; 01~ vVhy Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized 
as Markets, 96]. POL. ECON. 132, 152-55 (1988). 
107. Some states have attempted to limit out-of-state contributions, and some of these 
attempts have been invalidated on First Amendment grounds. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, 
Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1137 (2014). 
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Clause, Congress can preempt state and local regulation. 108 Interest groups 
with power at the federal level would likely find it less expensive to lobby 
for preemptive legislation than to set up and operate a lobbying presence in 
state and local governments. 
But national interest groups might have several reasons to oppose 
preemptive statutes. Although a national interest group may have less 
influence in certain states or localities than they have at the federal level, they 
may have more influence in other subnational governments. Where that is 
true, interest groups must weigh the protection that a preemptive statute 
might provide in unfavorable jurisdictions against the reduced flexibility it 
provides in favorable jurisdictions. 109 
Even if the national interest group as a collective would, on balance, 
benefit from federal preemption, some firms within the group might benefit 
more from the parochial benefits they receive in the state or locality in 
which they have influence. Dissensus within the national interest group 
might lead it not to take a position on preemption. 
In some cases, national interest groups might benefit from competition 
among states. When capital is mobile, industry often stands to benefit from 
a race-to-the-bottom among states competing for businesses to locate within 
their borders using favorable regulation, subsidies, or tax credits. 110 
Therefore, industry groups might oppose preemption because it would shut 
down the race-to-the-bottom. 
Moreover, the political economy of many regulatory issues is more 
complicated than the scenario in which one national interest group 
dominates. There may be a set of competing influential interest groups, 
and the best way for legislators to maximize their support is to refrain from 
passing federal legislation so as to permit them all to seek customized 
solutions in the state and local governments in which they are 
comparatively more powerful. 111 
Finally, it is worth reiterating that whether national interest groups 
succeed in blocking challenges to their power from rivals building up a base 
108. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
109. See Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic 17zeory ef 
Regulation: Toward A Public-Choice Explanation ef Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 276-81 (1990) 
[hereinafter Macey, Federalism] (arguing that beneficiaries of a state "regulatory regime that 
accumulates particularized expertise, reputational value, or human capital in a specific 
subject area," such as Delaware's corporate law or Connecticut's insurance law, will seek to 
protect those asset-specific investments from federal preemption). 
110. The extensive literature on the race-to-the-bottom argument began with Richard 
B. Stewart, Pyramids ef Sacrifice? Problems ef Federalism in Mandating State Implementation ef 
National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1211-12 (1977). 
111. See Macey, Federalism, supra note 109, at 281-84. 
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in state or local governments does not depend only on whether they have 
the capacity to do so. They must be aware of the potential threat to their 
influence and have the incentive to act on it. Because national interest 
groups might not closely monitor the activities of state and local 
governments, they may not recognize long-term threats until the political 
economy of a preemptive statute has changed. 
C. Subsidies v. Taxes 
The form of the benefit that interest groups aim to acquire or the cost 
they aim to avoid might also affect their success at influence. If firms' 
behavior were strictly rational, in a zero sum game with competitors, they 
would be indifferent to choosing between a law that imposed a tax on them 
and a law that granted a subsidy on their competitors. If legislators 
internalized the cost of adding to the public debt or imposing taxes as much 
as they internalized the benefit of public spending, they would demand 
equal compensation for spending on a subsidy as they would for not 
imposing a tax. But neither of these assumptions is always true, and the 
asymmetries between subsidies and taxes create opportunities for less 
powerful interest groups to grow and acquire power over the long term. 
The asymmetry between subsidies and taxes has two causes-cognitive 
and political. Firms rely on human decisionmakers, and thus their 
decisions will often reflect human cognitive biases. One such bias is "loss 
aversion"-the tendency to place more value on avoiding losses from a pre-
existing baseline than on acquiring gains from that baseline of equal 
magnitude. 112 There is extensive literature in cognitive psychology 
demonstrating loss aversion in experimental and real world decisionmaking 
contexts, 113 and there is also a literature in behavioral law and economics 
demonstrating that loss aversion pervades legal doctrines and institutions. 114 
If managers and lobbyists are loss averse, they will be more strongly 
motivated to prevent legislatures from imposing taxes or other restrictive 
regulations than they will be to gain subsidies. Likewise, even when 
business associations view their industry as a zero sum game with potential 
competitors, they should be more motivated to oppose taxes on themselves 
than subsidies for their competitors. 
The cognitive asymmetry favoring subsidies over taxes interacts with a 
112. The classic article is Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Anafysis 
ef Decision under Risk, 4 7 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
113. For a non-technical discussion, see DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND 
SLOW 283-86 (2011). 
114. See generalfy Eyal Zamir, Loss Aversion and the Law, 65 V AND. L. REV. 829(2012). 
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political asymmetry. 115 "\!\Then legislators enact a targeted subsidy, they can 
receive compensation from the concentrated interests it benefits and 
distribute the cost of that subsidy across the public as a whole by raising 
taxes or adding to the debt. Conversely, when legislators impose a targeted 
tax or other restriction, they impose a cost on concentrated interests and 
distribute the benefits across taxpayers or future generations. Therefore, 
targeted subsidies will be much easier to pass than targeted taxes. 
To be clear, subsidies often take the form of a tax credit rather than a 
direct subsidy, but this is because they "are perceived as unobtained 
revenue, rather than as direct spending. Consequently, they encounter less 
resistance on the part of those who do not receive them and are less 
stringently scrutinized." 116 
Legislators also have a more general incentive to pass fiscally 
expansionary policies, which will generally increase employment and 
stimulate the economy through multiplier effects. If this spending is debt-
financed, the economic cost ¥!ill be deferred to future generations. The 
political cost ·will be deferred to future legislators. This is another example 
of myopic incentives at work. 
The upshot of this political analysis is that, per dollar of lobbying 
expenditure, it will be easier to procure a subsidy-or a tax credit-rather 
than a tax or restrictive regulation. This conclusion matters to the power of 
interest groups if subsidies exhibit diminishing marginal returns. They may 
be more valuable to a nascent firm or industry than to established ones. 
Loss aversion reinforces this power dynamic. Incumbent interest groups 
may be more motivated to prevent a legislature from imposing taxes or 
restrictions on themselves than to prevent a legislature from giving subsidies 
to their competitors. The net effect is that interest groups with relatively 
little money to influence legislators can spend efficiently on subsidies. 
Over time, subsidies can gradually build up a new industry. While 
incumbent firms may have avoided the direct economic threat of taxes or 
restrictive regulations, they may have missed the indirect political threat of 
subsidies to rivals. That can be a consequential mistake. An industry's 
capacity to avoid direct economic threats like taxes and restrictive 
regulation over the long run depends on their continuing political influence. 
115. See generally Andrew Green, You Can't Pay Them Enough: Subsidies, Environmental Law, 
and Social .Nmms, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 407 (2006) (conceding that subsidies are 
politically easier than taxes but criticizing them for, inter alia, being susceptible to rent 
seeking). 
116. See Zamir, supra note 114, at 866. 
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D. vVhy the Limits Matter 
Each of these limits on interest group power creates an opportunity for 
less powerful groups to obtain influence. The most important opportunities 
might be interactions among myopic incentives, federalism, and the 
asymmetry between subsidies and taxes. The change in interest group 
power might come from a firm that builds its power over time from a 
regionalized base, a subsidy to a firm that will only have an adverse interest 
in the future, a subsidy out of a state or local budget, or a combination of all 
three factors. 
Changes in the ways by which interest groups hold power will not always 
result in new legislation and regulation. Even when the new economy of 
influence does lead to new legislation or regulation, there is no a priori 
reason to expect that it will benefit the public interest rather than the 
interest of newly powerful private groups. But some changes in the balance 
of private power can advance the public interest, and those changes are 
partially predictable. 
Parts III-V analyze the political economy of risk regulation. They 
identify the three primary groups that can have a predictable private 
interest in public-interested health, safety, and environmental regulation. 
Part III examines business firms that have some interests that conflict with 
the interests of powerful risk-creating industries. Part IV focuses on 
insurers, a set of wealthy, influential businesses unusual among large 
commercial interests in their capacity to profit from risk reduction. Part V 
considers lawyers, some of whom stand to gain from suits against risk-
creating firms. 
In each of these three categories, the analysis is complicated. Industry, 
insurers, and lawyers have the potential to engage in socially wasteful rent-
seeking. The alignment between their private interest and the public 
interest is, by definition, coincidental. But, for each group, carefully 
designed legal interventions may encourage that alignment, enhance their 
influence, and ultimately lead to justified regulation. 
III. INDUSTRY 
A. Theory 
To understand the potential for private firms to support public-interested 
risk regulation, we need a model of a firm's incentives. The archetypal firm 
in this model is the risk-creating firm. Firms can create risks to health, 
safety, and the environment in three ways. First, their products and 
services can pose risks for the intended consumer. Second, the process that 
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produces the firm's goods can pose risks to its employees. Third, the firm's 
activities can create externalities, risks to individuals who are not in a 
contractual relationship with the firm. We can call those who bear the cost 
of externalities "bystanders," even though in most cases they will not be 
literal bystanders. 
Risk regulation aims to mitigate all three types of risk-to consumers, 
workers, and bystanders. In the case of bystanders, the justification for 
regulation is straightforward. Bystanders cannot bargain to avoid the cost 
of externalities. Firms need to be required to internalize the costs they 
impose on others to minimize total social cost. In the case of consumer and 
worker protective regulation, the justification is more complicated. 
According to the rational actor model, consumers and workers should take 
these costs into account when deciding whether to do business with the 
firm. But, as economists have long conceded, consumers and workers may 
not appreciate these costs because they have imperfect information and are 
on the disadvantaged side of an information asymmetry with the risk-
creating firm. 117 Even if they are fully informed of the risk, their ability to 
act on it may be limited due to bounded rationality. 118 Risk regulation can 
be justified as a means to protect consumers and workers against these 
predictable market failures. 
Risk regulation achieves these ends by imposing costs on risk-creating 
firms: banning or restricting certain activities or methods; requiring 
permits, licenses, training, or education; mandating disclosure, labeling, or 
informed consent; or taxing the firm or activity directly. According to 
public choice theory, associations of risk-creating firms will seek to remove 
these costs to incumbents and impose these costs on potential new 
entrants. 119 The potential for firms to endorse public-interested risk 
regulation exists when there are firms which have an incentive to impose 
costly regulation on incumbent risk-creating firms. 
There are two broad categories of firms that might have such an 
incentive. One category is differentially risk-creating firms, which produce 
the same goods or provide the same service as incumbent risk-creating 
firms, but do so in a way that creates less risk for consumers, workers, or 
bystanders. 120 Examples of differentially risk-creating firms include those 
11 7. See, e.g., POSNER, ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 182-83. 
118. See Jolls et al., supra note 58, at 1477-79. 
119. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 572 (2001) ("The impetus for environmental regulation sometimes 
comes, implicitly or explicitly, from the regulated firms themselves, which can obtain rents 
and barriers to entry that give them an advantage over their competitors."). 
120. See id. at 573-74 (analyzing the incentives that "Differential Costs on Regulated 
Firms" create). 
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that produce cleaner energy, safer cars, or healthier foods. The other 
category is risk-mitigating firms-firms that produce goods or provide 
services designed to mitigate the risks that risk-creating firms produce. 121 
This category includes firms that produce smoke alarms, motorcycle 
helmets, and pollution scrubbers. Firms in both of these categories will 
sometimes stand to profit from public-interested risk regulation, but not 
always. 
Differentially risk-creating firms face a choice whether to join or defect 
from a risk-creating industry's political coalition. If they defect, they will be 
able to lobby for, and potentially procure, regulation that gives them a 
competitive advantage over other firms in the industry. The regulation 
might require other firms in the industry to adopt their product features or 
production process or otherwise move toward the differentially risk-creating 
firm's performance. 122 The differentially risk-creating firm can realize the 
benefit of its first-mover advantages, as other firms engage in research and 
development or costly transitions. 123 It might also benefit from possessing 
relevant intellectual property, which it can license to other firms in the 
industry. 124 
A differentially risk-creating firm will pay a price for defecting from an 
industry association. The firm will no longer have a vote in the industry's 
lobbying efforts on issues of mutual concern, and the industry can lobby for 
regulations that target the defector. Whether the benefits of defecting 
outweigh its costs will depend on the specific facts of the situation. The 
degree of difference between the defector firm's risk creation and the 
median firm in the industry's risk creation will be one, but not the only, 
factor driving the decision. 
Risk-mitigating firms do not need to defect from industry associations, 
but these firms may actually be more susceptible to industry pressure. They 
have the incentive to lobby for regulation that will create a market for their 
products and services in the form of rules requiring firms to purchase the 
products and services or standards that make it economical to do so. 125 But 
121. See id. at 5 7 4-7 5 (analyzing the benefits of regulation to "Producers of Pollution 
Control Equipment and Inputs to Production Processes"). 
122. See id. at 573 ("Some firms may be able to adjust their production processes more 
easily than others. These relative beneficiaries of government regulation are likely to oppose 
relaxing regulatory requirements and may even favor extending them."). 
123. See Marvin B. Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-Mover Advantages, 9 
STRATEGIC MGMT.]. 41, 41-47 (1988). 
124. See id. at 43-44. 
125. See Revesz, supra note 119, at 574 ("The impetus for regulation sometimes comes 
from manufacturers of pollution control equipment, environmentally friendly technologies, 
or inputs to production processes favored by the regulatory regime."). 
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because that kind of regulation would impose costs on the risk-creating 
industry, risk-mitigating firms might not pursue it. If a risk-mitigating firm 
markets its product or service directly to the risk-creating firms, the risk-
creating firms might decide not to do business with the risk-mitigating firm. 
If the risk-mitigating firm markets to consumers, risk-creating firms might 
make the products or services they market to consumers incompatible with 
what the risk-mitigating firm provides. The mere threat of these scenarios 
might deter risk-mitigating firms from seeking regulation that is otherwise 
in their interest. 
These reasons why differentially risk-creating firms and risk-mitigating 
firms might not want to cross risk-creating industry associations, however, 
assume that the lobbying activity will be transparent and that the risk-
creating firms will retaliate swiftly. It is plausible that neither of the 
assumptions will be true in practice. But even if they were true, the 
economic gain of the regulation might outweigh the loss that industry 
retaliation will cause. 
B. Empirical Plausibiliry 
Different sources of energy emit carbon at different rates, so energy firms 
that rely on cleaner sources-differentially risk-creating firms-will have a 
competitive interest in tighter regulation. Firms that rely heavily on 
renewable fuels are the simplest example, but even firms that rely on 
natural gas or nuclear energy might support carbon regulation if they 
anticipate that it will lead them to gain market share over firms more 
reliant on coal. The same is true for utilities that have an energy portfolio 
less reliant on fossil fuels generally or coal specifically. 
Eric Biber argues that California has successfully created an interest 
group base for regulation to reduce carbon emissions by gradually 
subsidizing its renewable energy industry. 126 He points to California's tax 
credits and subsidies for renewable energy in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, California's renewable portfolio standard for utilities passed in 2002, 
and California's more comprehensive regulation of greenhouse gases in 
2006. 127 These measures, he claims, built up a clean energy industry in the 
state, tied jobs to its future, and thereby changed the incentives of utilities 
and other energy businesses. 128 
In 2010, California voted on Proposition 23, a ballot initiative that 
would have reversed the 2006 climate change legislation. The two largest 
contributors to the campaign were Texas-based firms Valero and Tesoro, 
126. See Biber, supra note 18, at 401-02. 
127. See id. at 420-21. 
128. See id. at421-25. 
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which opponents attacked as "Texas oil companies." 129 Important business 
interests, such as the California Chamber of Commerce, Chevron, and the 
Western States Petroleum Association, that had traditionally opposed 
environmental regulation, including the 2006 law, did not contribute to the 
campaign. 130 One of the state's largest utilities, Pacific Gas and Electric, 
which had heavily invested in renewable energy, actually contributed to the 
opposition. 131 Proposition 23 failed by over 20 percent. 132 Biber 
concludes, 
While there may have been multiple reasons for the change in position, 
including a strategic calculation that the ballot initiative was a losing 
proposition not worth investing in compared to lobbying in the legislature, 
another possibility is that investments made by California firms in the wake 
of [the 2006 legislation] in order to comply with the law made further 
resistance unattractive. 133 
Each of the three dynamic limits on the power of interest groups played 
a role. The development of pro-regulatory interest groups occurred over 
decades. That development critically relied on idiosyncratic features of 
California's, rather than the nation's, political economy. The legislation 
that initiated the change in interest group power took the form of subsidies 
and tax credits, but when the power of clean energy interest grew, the 
legislature was willing to enact restrictive regulation. 
Could California's victory for more aggressive environmental regulation 
be repeated at the federal level? With the prevailing balance of interest 
group power, it probably could not. But as the national renewable energy 
industry grows in California and other states and as the federal government 
encourages that growth with subsidies or tax credits, it is plausible that the 
political will for federal environmental legislation will become strong 
enough to tip the balance. 134 
C. Coriflicting Interests 
The main difficulty with subsidizing differentially risk-creating firms or 
risk-mitigating firms is that they are incentivized to seek regulation that 
129. Id. at413,417. 
130. See id. at 424-25. 
131. Id. at 415-16. 
132. Biber, supra note 18, at 400. 
133. Id. at 425 (footnotes omitted). 
134. Some interest groups are potential winners from climate change, and they might be 
a countervailing force against legislation even if a stronger democratic consensus around the 
existence of climate change emerges. See generally J.B. Ruhl, The Political Economy ef Climate 
Change Winners, 97 MINN. L. REV. 206 (2012). 
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creates or enlarges a market for their product or service, rather than 
regulation that simply reduces the risk in the most efficient way. This 
potential misalignment between a firm's interest and the public interest is 
particularly problematic if, as is the case for many areas of risk regulation, 
the technologies that risk-creating, differentially risk-creating, and risk-
mitigating firms market are developing rapidly. Because empowering 
interest groups to pursue regulation is a long-term project, the potential 
that the misalignment widens in the interim is significant. 
The history of ethanol subsidies offers a cautionary tale. In 2005 and 
2007, Congress enacted legislation designed in part to increase the amount 
of ethanol in gasoline. 135 Lobbying from corn-based ethanol producers was 
in large part responsible for the legislation. 136 Although proponents 
defended the subsidies on environmental grounds, the increased use of 
ethanol did little to mitigate environmental risks and may have exacerbated 
them and raised food prices in the developing world as well. 137 
The ethanol case is not a perfect example because most energy experts 
doubted that a transition to ethanol would bring a net benefit to the 
environment even at the time of the initial decision to subsidize it. 138 But 
some environmentalists did support ethanol as a happy marriage of 
convenience between a powerful corn lobby and a perceived strategy for 
reducing the consumption of fossil fuels. 139 At least in theory, the ethanol 
industry might have become a lobbying force supporting the regulation of 
fossil fuels. Arguably, a similar dynamic is at work today, as some 
environmentalists endorse the expansion of the natural gas industry, 
reasoning that switching to gas from coal will reduce carbon emissions. 
That reasoning is correct for now-the rise of natural gas energy has 
reduced emissions by displacing coal 140-but the strength of natural gas 
interests in the future may be an obstacle to regulation that would compel a 
transition to renewable energy. 
135. Arnold W. Reitze,Jr., Bio.feels-Snake Oilfar the Twenty-First Century, 87 OR. L. REV. 
1183, 1202-03 (2008). 
136. See id. at 1203. 
137. See id. at 1203-12. 
138. See id. at 1204-05. 
139. See id. at 1203-04 (stating that "environmentalists ... were advocating the use of 
alcohol fuels" in the 1990s). 
140. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. ENERGY-RELATED CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS, 
2012 vii-ix (2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/carbon/ 
archive/20 l 2/pdf/20 l 2_co2analysis.pdf ( concluding that "the increase in natural gas-fired 
generation, while coal-fired generation decreased, substantially reduced the carbon intensity 
of electricity generation" in recent years). 
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D. Prescriptions 
In the case of fossil fuel emissions, the optimal regulation may be a 
carbon tax, which would directly cause firms to internalize the cost of 
carbon emissions. One benefit of a carbon tax is that it does not require 
the government to "pick winners" in the contest for cleaner energy. 
,vhatever technology reduces the risk most efficiently-whether it is a 
differentially risk-creating technology like natural gas or a risk-mitigating 
technology like carbon sequestration-would be the least expensive means 
to comply with the regulation. However, in part due to the political 
asymmetry between taxes or restrictive regulation and subsidies, carbon 
taxes are rare and clean energy subsidies are commonplace. 
The challenge then is to design legislation that takes the form of a 
subsidy or tax credit yet is broad enough that it will not advantage any 
particular technology, thereby creating an interest group with ultimately 
counterproductive incentives. California's early subsidies, which 
exclusively focused on the renewable energy industry, might not have 
opened the possibility for cleaner fossil fuels or carbon sequestration, but 
they avoided promoting ethanol. Congress enacted a small subsidy 
program of production tax credits for renewable energy in the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992 and subsequent renewals, and that program may have 
helpful interest group effects in the long run. The future effects may even 
be greater if the tax credits were larger. 141 
Generalizable lessons can be drawn from these experiences with energy 
subsidies. Differentially risk-creating firms can be a powerful force for 
public-interested risk regulation, and it is at least plausible that they might 
be able to ally with risk-mitigating firms on some issues as well. Even so, 
they will often have incentives to push legislation and regulation that more 
narrowly favors their products and services than a purely public-interested 
regulation would. There are four potential strategies to address this 
problem while still working around currently powerful risk-creating interest 
groups. 
First, legislators could subsidize a diverse set of differentially risk-creating 
or risk-mitigating firms, so that no one particular firm's technology would 
dominate. The market might help determine which of the subsidized firms 
grew enough to become a powerful interest group in the future. In the 
best-case scenario, the subsidized firms could form an issue-based coalition 
to lobby for generalized regulation that was not achievable before the 
141. See Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design ef a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 552-53 (2009). 
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subsidy. 
Second, the subsidy could be distributed through grants from a 
commission of independent, technocratic experts. This is, of course, how 
the government distributes funds for most of its scientific and medical 
research. The commission would be able to decide which technologies 
were the most promising based on their merits. It could recalibrate its 
distributions as experimental results rolled in. The commission's insulation 
from interest group pressure would cause it to distribute grants to firms that 
would be the most useful interest groups for pursuing public-interested 
regulation. 
Third, the subsidy could take the form of a prize. 142 For example, the 
government could award a prize to a firm that demonstrates a technology 
capable of achieving some risk-reducing goal within some cost constraint. 
The advantage of a prize system is that it allows private actors maximum 
flexibility to select the most efficient means to reduce the risk. At least in 
theory, firms working toward the prize would be able to finance research 
and development with funding from investors willing to bet on the firm's 
strategy in exchange for a share of the prize. If investors bet well, the right 
firms would gain interest group power. 
Fourth, and most controversially, the subsidy could be targeted at 
existing risk-creating firms. For example, Congress could give existing 
energy firms an incentive to open renewable energy plants. The hope 
would be that opening this line of business might, over time, reorient the 
interests of the risk-creating firms. The obvious downside to this approach 
is that money is fungible, and the risk-creating firms could use that money 
for lobbying that would undermine public-interested risk regulation. But 
the benefit is that such a subsidy would be especially easy to achieve 
politically. If it could be carefully designed so as to compel risk-creating 
firms to significantly invest in less risk-creating technologies, it could work 
as a Trojan Horse strategy to change the political agenda of firms from the 
inside. 
IV. INSURERS 
A. Theory 
Insurance markets exist because of the persistence of irreducible risks to 
life, health, and valuable property. In the long term, insurers stand to lose 
from technological and social developments that will reduce risk and, in 
142. For an economic analysis of the incentives that prizes create, see generally Steven 
Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44].L. & ECON. 525 
(2001). 
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turn, the demand for insurance coverage. But in the short and medium 
term, insurers stand to profit from certain kinds of reductions in risk and, 
therefore, have an incentive to support certain kinds of regulations that 
reduce risk. 
Insurance markets can create two kinds of information asymmetries-
adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection occurs when 
potential insureds have private knowledge about their own riskiness and use 
that information when they decide whether to purchase an insurance 
policy, leading high-risk individuals to be more likely to purchase 
insurance. 143 Moral hazard occurs when insureds take less precaution 
against risks because they have purchased insurance policies to cover the 
consequences of those risks. 144 
Insurers have developed strategies for reducing both types of information 
asymmetries. They reduce the chance of adverse selection through 
underwriting, risk classification, and ex post investigation. 145 They reduce 
the chance of moral hazard through underwriting, deductibles, 
copayments, and refusals to insure. 146 But none of these strategies 
completely eliminates information asymmetries, and therefore insurers still 
have an incentive to support regulation that further reduces such 
asymmetries. There are three main reasons for this incentive: the temporal 
lag between when premiums are set and when losses that lead to claims 
occur; the competition among insurers; and the predictability of risk. 
First, there is a temporal lag between when insurers and insureds assess 
the risk being insured and when that risk materializes, if it does at all. 147 At 
least in a market with perfect information, a reduction in risk that occurs 
prior to when an insured purchases a policy or renegotiates a premium 
143. The seminal article on adverse selection is George A. Akerlof, The Market for 
"Lemons'~· ()Jialiry Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 QJ. ECON. 488 (1970). For a 
critique of assumptions about adverse selection in insurance law scholarship, see generally 
Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE LJ. 1223 
(2004). 
144. For a history of the concept, see generally Tom Baker, On the Genealogy ef Moral 
Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996). 
145. Siegelman, supra note 143, at 1261-62. 
146. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces 
Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 205-09 (2012). For empirical evidence that insurers' 
activities reduce moral hazard, see Haitao Yin et al., Risk-Based Pricing and Risk-Reducing E.ifort: 
Does the Private Insurance Market Reduce Environmental Accidents?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 325 (2011). 
But, for an argument that insurers' efforts to reduce moral hazard over history were aimed 
primarily to legitimate their business and, in some cases, were based on dubious stereotypes, 
see Baker, supra note 144, at 244-67. 
147. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 146, at 204. 
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should be incorporated into the cost of the policy and the level of the 
premiums. In a competitive market, when some significant reduction in 
risk occurs, insurers will need to adjust premiums downward or be undercut 
by competition. But insurance policies may have lengthy terms, and 
premiums may be reset infrequently; thus, any reduction in risk that occurs 
between when a premium is initially set and when the risk materializes into 
a loss that gives rise to claim will reduce what the insurer needs to pay out. 
Consequently, insurers have a strong incentive to support regulation that 
reduces risk over the short and medium term. 
Second, in addition to the general incentive the whole industry has to 
reduce risk, individual insurers may stand to benefit competitively from the 
reduction of the particular risks. 148 This would be the case, for example, if 
the risk reduction were concentrated in a market segment or a jurisdiction 
in which the particular insurer has a greater market share. Insurers might 
also benefit competitively from a reduction in risk simply because they 
anticipated it and set policies accordingly. Now, of course, the limitation to 
this incentive is that insurers, like most firms, engage in much of their 
political activity through industry associations, which can be expected to 
pursue regulations that benefit the interests of the industry as a whole. But 
it is plausible that regulation will reduce risk across the board because of 
temporal lag, but reduce risks even more for particular firms. For this 
reason, the insurance industry's lobbyists might seek risk-reducing 
regulation, even if one firm supports it more for competitive reasons. 
Third, insurers also have a more subtle incentive to reduce risk because 
they prefer more easily quantifiable and predictable risks. When an insurer 
can easily quantify and predict a risk, it is less prone to adverse selection 
and it can take steps to reduce moral hazard. Therefore, whether insurers 
decide to insure a risk hinges in part on whether the risk can be predicted 
and quantified. But even once an insurer has decided to insure a given risk, 
it still gains from greater predictability by being able to price premiums 
more accurately. One fortunate consequence of this preference for 
predictable risks is that insurers prefer to insure risks to property, which are 
easily quantifiable, rather than risks to physical harm and suffering, which 
can vary wildly, especially but not exclusively if jury damage decisions are 
involved. 149 So, in some cases, insurers will have the incentive to seek 
regulation that transmutes health and safety risks into property risks. 
Because of these incentives, one should expect insurers and insurance 
148. See id. 
149. See generally Robert Kneuper & Bruce Yandle, Auto Insurers and the Air Bag, 61 J. RISK 
& INS. 107 (1994) (explaining insurers' lobbying for air bags on the ground that they reduce 
actuarial uncertainty). 
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industry assoc1at10ns to be strong political supporters of aggressive risk 
regulation, unless that regulation would limit a risky yet insurable activity 
entirely. The insurance industry also has other distinctive features that 
make them especially valuable interest groups. Insurers have deep pockets, 
which gives them a significant budget for lobbying. 150 The insurance 
market is highly concentrated, and thus the industry has the classic 
organizational advantages that public choice theory predicts. 151 
More abstractly, since insurers are highly regulated, they benefit from 
being repeat players and are continually invested in influencing public 
policy. 152 Because of the nature of their business, they are accustomed to 
long range planning. In the United States, insurance is primarily regulated 
at the state level, so insurer interests can sometimes achieve regulation in 
particular states that would not be viable at the federal level initially and 
then move to expand that regulation after interest group power changes. 
B. Empirical Plausibiliry 
Insurers have a long history of lobbying for risk regulation. Property 
insurers have, for example, lobbied for changes in and more enforcement of 
building codes. 153 However, the most dramatic examples have come from 
the lobbying of auto insurers. 
One reason why auto thefts have declined so much in recent decades is 
the widespread adoption of the clandestine radio transmitter device called 
LoJ ack. Lo] ack allows police to track a car after it has been stolen, 
increasing the likelihood that the car is ultimately recovered. Because 
potential thieves cannot distinguish between vehicles that have and that do 
not have LoJ ack installed, as it is added to more vehicles in a region, auto 
theft becomes less lucrative at a greater than linear rate. Therefore, much 
of the benefit of Lo] ack-a lower general rate of auto theft-is externalized 
because it accrues to car owners other than the owner who installs the 
150. The insurance industry contributed $58.7 million to federal parties, candidates, and 
outside groups in 2012 and spent more than $154 million on federal lobbying in 2013. 
Viveca Novak, Insurance: Background, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., 
http:/ /www.opensecrets.org/industries/background.php?cycle=20 l 4&ind=F09 (last 
updated Aug. 2014). 
151. See, e.g., D. ANDREW AUSTIN & THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R40834, THE MARKET STRUCTURE OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY 27-29 
(2009). 
152. Galanter uses insurance companies as an example of archetypal repeat players in 
litigation. See Galanter, supra note 6, at 97. 
153. See also Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 146, at 212. 
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device. 154 Auto insurers have an interest in reducing theft for a wide base 
of insureds, so they have lobbied successfully to change state laws to 
increase the insurance discount for LoJ ack. 155 
But while the Lojack example demonstrates that insurers have lobbied 
for risk-reducing regulation, there was no obvious lobbying force opposing 
the LoJ ack requirement. In contrast, auto insurers faced powerful 
opponents when they lobbied for regulation requiring airbags. Scholars 
have argued that insurers' preference for easily quantifiable and predictable 
risks explains their persistent lobbying efforts for mandatory air bags. 156 
Despite opposition from automakers, who argued for mandating seat belts 
as a lower cost alternative, 157 insurers successfully pressured the federal 
government to adopt a mandate and successfully litigated to overturn the 
Reagan Administration's brief rescinding of the rule. 158 Insurers favored 
air bags because they would reduce the most severe types of injury, which 
could lead to unpredictable jury awards and because they transmuted 
highly volatile bodily injury losses into property losses. 159 
C. Conflicting Interests 
Insurers have an interest in undermining laws designed to protect 
insureds. Just as insurers have the salutary incentive to lobby for 
regulations that reduce the risk of adverse events that could give rise to 
claims, they also have the pernicious incentive to lobby for regulations that 
allow them to deny claims when those events do occur. This means 
lobbying for rules, or litigating for doctrines, that read policy coverage 
narrowly, read exclusions broadly, and allow insurers broad discretion in 
crafting lawyerly policies. 
Insurers also seek the right to refuse to insure high-risk insureds to 
reduce the chance of adverse selection. Sometimes, refusals to insure can 
be socially beneficial. For example, when an auto insurer refuses to insure 
a driver with a dubious safety record or when a homeowner's insurance 
company refuses to insure a home in a disaster-prone region, the refusal 
might result in the would-be insured foregoing what would have been a 
risky activity. Yet refusals to insure are only socially useful when it is 
154. See general!JJ Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, Measuring Positive Externalities from 
Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Ana[ysis ef Lojack, 113 QJ. ECON. 43 (1998) 
(providing empirical evidence of externalities resulting from the use of Lojack). 
155. See id. at 73. See also Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 146, at 212. 
156. See Kneuper & Yandle, supra note 149, at 111-14. 
157. See id. at 107. 
158. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 
(1983). 
159. See Kneuper & Yandle, supra note 149, at 111-12. 
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possible for the consumer to avoid the activity that causes the risk. With life 
and health insurance, that is often not the case. Insureds can sometimes 
stop smoking, but they cannot do anything about certain medical 
conditions. One central reform of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was to 
prevent health insurers from denying coverage for "pre-existing 
conditions." 160 The health insurance industry only agreed to this regulation 
in exchange for receiving a group of new, low risk customers-healthy 
young people who might not have purchased health insurance policies until 
the individual mandate required them to do so. 161 
For these reasons, simply subsidizing insurers to give them more 
lobbying power is ill advised. They are as likely to use that power to loosen 
the rules preventing them from denying claims or refusing to insure as they 
are to use that power to advance risk regulation. Even within the context of 
risk regulation, insurers will oppose legislation that would totally eliminate 
an insurable risk or at least prohibit the behavior that would create that 
risk, although it is difficult to imagine practical examples where this 
incentive would be relevant, other than the possibility of autonomous 
vehicles effectively eliminating auto collisions. 
D. Prescriptions 
Changing insurers' political agenda requires changing who purchases 
insurance coverage and what it covers. The more insureds engage in or are 
exposed to a particular risk, the more an insurer will internalize the benefits 
of reducing that risk. There are generally four ways that regulation can 
broaden coverage: it can make insurance cheaper for all consumers by 
subsidy; it can make insurance cheaper for a class of consumers by 
prohibiting insurers from discriminating against members of that class; it 
can make insurance available to the previously uninsurable by prohibiting 
insurers from refusing to insure them; and, most dramatically, it can 
mandate insurance coverage. 
When the state subsidizes insurance, it enriches insurers, which could 
directly increase their interest group power; however, the main political 
effect of a subsidy is indirect. Because more consumers will purchase 
insurance at the discounted price, insurers will stand to profit more from 
regulations that reduce their insureds' risk, so they will be more likely, on 
the margin, to lobby for them. In some cases, a subsidy could have 
desirable distributive effects. As a subsidy enables consumers with lower 
160. The provis10ns relating to pre-existing conditions can be found in 
42 U.S.C. § 18,001 (2012). 
161. The individual mandate is codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012). 
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incomes to afford insurance, insurers would have an incentive to reduce 
risks that impact lower income groups. 
The same political effects can be achieved through prohibiting insurers 
from discriminating against members of a class or refusing to insure them 
entirely. 162 One difference between these types of regulations is who pays 
for the new coverage. A subsidy spreads the cost out over all taxpayers. A 
ban on a type of discrimination or on certain refusals spreads out the cost 
on other insureds. But the latter two policies have the benefit of 
guaranteeing that a particular class will be covered. If these policies are not 
designed carefully, however, they could push insurers out of the market or 
raise prices on other insureds to the point where they no longer purchase 
msurance. 
An insurance mandate differs from the other three types of regulation in 
that it targets consumers rather than insurers. It acts as a subsidy to 
insurers by providing them with a new set of customers. One might think 
that insurers would always welcome insurance mandates for that reason, 
but the auto insurance industry actually fought state auto insurance 
mandates for decades, in part because they predicted that being forced to 
cover high-risk drivers would reduce their net profits. 163 Contrast that 
example with ACA, where insurers accepted the requirement to cover "pre-
existing conditions" in exchange for the mandate. Thus, unlike the 
examples of differentially risk-creating and risk-mitigating firms discussed 
above, insurers might actually lobby against the very legal changes that will 
give them the incentive to lobby for public-interested risk regulation. 
The main benefit of using regulation expanding insurance coverage as a 
means for building support for public-interested regulation is that it is an 
especially stealthy, long-term strategy. The relevant risk-creating industry 
might not appreciate that insurers will have interests adverse to them, and, 
therefore, they might not invest in opposing the expansion. In fact, for 
some activities, the risk-creating industry might even support an insurance 
mandate because the existence of an insurance market might make a risky 
activity seem safer to outsiders. In contracting, for example, an insurance 
requirement might improve the contracting industry's reputation by 
compelling the risky subset of contractors who would not purchase 
insurance in the absence of a mandate to comply with insurers' 
requirements or leave the market. 
162. Laws prohibiting insurers from discriminating based on certain kinds of class 
membership vary considerably among the states. See Ronen Avraham et al., Understanding 
Insurance Antidiscrimination Laws, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 195, 235-66 (2014). 
163. See Jennifer B. Wriggins, Mandates, Markets, and Risk: Auto Insurance and the Affordable 
Care Act, 19 CONN. INS. LJ. 27 5, 311 (2013). 
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Expanding insurance coverage to a new market might also create the 
possibility for interest group alliances with other firms, like differentially 
risk-creating and risk-mitigating firms. The LoJ ack example is instructive. 
The risk-mitigating firm on its own did not have the clout to get state 
insurance commissioners to create discounts for its products, but insurers 
provided the lobbying power. It is probably not a coincidence that this 
alliance formed in the auto insurance market, a market where insurers 
benefit from a mandate. 
One important advantage of using insurers as an interest group to 
advance risk regulation is that there is a separation between the agencies 
that regulate insurance and the agencies that regulate risk in which insurers 
might have an interest. Insurers are regulated through state insurance 
commissions, 164 but most risk regulation occurs in federal administrative 
agencies. This separation has two beneficial effects. 
First, because regulation expanding insurance coverage will be enacted 
in state legislatures or promulgated by state insurance commissions, it might 
remain below the political radar. The risk-creating firms that might have 
an interest in opposing it may be focused on federal risk regulation agencies 
and Congress and might not monitor events in state insurance law. At a 
minimum, they will not be repeat players in those arenas. 
Second, to the extent that subsidizing insurers will increase their socially 
wasteful rent-seeking behavior, that behavior will be targeted at different 
agencies than their socially beneficial rent-seeking. Therefore, if state 
insurance commissions can be fortified against the influence of insurer 
lobbying, subsidies to insurers that are used for political purposes may be 
directed toward public-interested regulation. 
V.LAWYERS 
A. 17zeory 
Law firms resemble conventional business firms in their political activity. 
They form industry associations, hire lobbyists, and attempt to influence 
legislation and regulation. As public choice theory predicts, some of the 
164. For a description of how state insurance commissions work and an analysis of the 
reasons for why regulation is left to the states, see generally Susan Randall, Insurance 
Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Association ef Insurance 
Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625 (1999). Congress has codified a declaration that 
"the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in 
the public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to 
impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States." 
15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2012). 
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most influential lawyer organizations are concentrated ones: groups that 
represent some small segment of the bar with cohesive interests. For risk 
regulation, there are two important sets of lawyer interests. The first is the 
plaintiffs' bar, which sometimes lobbies and litigates for more aggressive 
private law risk regulation through the tort system. 165 The second is the set 
of lawyers who represent individuals in suits based on the many causes of 
action that risk regulation statutes create. 
This Article so far has focused on public law risk regulation-the health, 
safety, and environmental statutes that legislatures pass and the rules that 
administrative agencies promulgate to implement them. The mechanism 
of lobbying for changes in this area of risk regulation is the familiar strategy 
of influencing legislators and regulators. But much of risk regulation comes 
through the deterrent effect of state tort law. Some of the political activity 
that influences the development of state common law comes through 
impact litigation, rather than lobbying. Interest groups can influence 
doctrinal changes by bringing test cases in state appellate courts. 
Lawyer interest groups are especially effective at these strategies. The 
service they market-advocacy-is the same service that they need to 
advance their political agenda, which makes them savvy consumers of 
political activity. As its members appear in court repeatedly to represent 
the same interests, the plaintiffs' bar has some repeat player advantages. 166 
Litigation that has the potential to shift doctrine can be an unintended 
byproduct of lawyers' regular business, and the individual members of a 
lawyer interest group may have an unusually strong stake in the outcome 
because their clients' interest aligns with the interest of the organization. 
The plaintiffs' bar can also affect the development of state common law 
by influencing the judicial selection process. In states with judicial 
elections, this will mean contributing to judicial election or retention 
campaigns. 167 In other states, lawyer organizations partially control the 
selection process directly, and thus the plaintiffs' bar can influence who is 
165. For a history of the organization of the plaintiffs' bar, see John Fabian Witt, 
Bureaucratic Legalism, American Style: Pri:oate Bureaucratic Legalism and the Governance ef the Tort 
!iYstem, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 261, 263-71 (2007). For an account of the plaintiffs' bar's role in 
more recent tort reform battles, see Anthony J. Sebok, Dispatches from the Tort Wars, 85 TEX. 
L. REV. 1465, 1502-04 (2007) (book review). 
166. But see Galanter, supra note 6, at 118 (reasoning that a specialized plaintiffs' bar 
"should overcome the gap in expertise, allow some economies of scale, provide for 
bargaining commitment and personal familiarity. But this is short of overcoming the 
fundamental strategic advantages of [repeat players]-their capacity to structure the 
transaction, play the odds, and influence rule-development and enforcement policy."). 
167. On the role of the bar in judicial elections, see generally Anthony Champagne, 
Interest Groups and Judicial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1391 (2001 ). 
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named to the bench by joining selection committees. 168 
Sometimes the development of state tort law can be influenced through 
lobbying as well. The tort reform movement has led to a rise in damage 
caps and other statutory limits on liability, 169 and the plaintiffs' bar has 
fought back. 170 The outcome of the political struggle over these statutes 
hinges on who has influence in state legislatures. Congress also has the 
potential to affect state tort law through preemption. Legislative efforts to 
limit state tort law have also spilled back into litigation. The plaintiffs' bar 
has relied in part on constitutional challenges to invalidate tort reform 
statutes. 171 
In tort law risk regulation, the plaintiffs' bar has an interest in broad 
liability, unlimited damages, 172 and unlimited attorneys' fees. It should be 
obvious that some of these incentives are potentially socially wasteful. But 
they can be socially useful. At least in theory, tort law causes risk-creating 
firms to internalize the costs of their activities. Because of the time and 
expense involved, a lack of legal sophistication, or fatalism, many plaintiffs 
would not bring meritorious suits in the absence of an aggressive plaintiffs' 
bar, which would undermine tort law's socially useful deterrent effect. 
It is conceivable that, because lawyer interest groups have special 
political advantages in litigation rather than lobbying or among judges 
rather than legislators, they have a relative advantage over risk-creating 
firms in influencing private law risk regulation. If that is true, private law 
risk regulation might serve as a failsafe when risk-creating firms are able to 
168. Many states select judges through a process known as "the Missouri Plan," in which 
lawyers' or state bar associations are heavily represented on the selection commission. For 
an authoritative summary of state judicial selection methods, see AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y, 
JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: CURRENT STATUS (2011), available at 
http://www.judicialselection.us/ uploads/ documents/] udicial_Merit_ Charts_ 0FC2022 5 EC 
6C2.pdf. 
169. For an authoritative list of statutory reforms to tort law, see Ronen Avraham, 
Database cf State Tort Law Reforms (5th) (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. e555, 
2014), available at http:/ /papers.ssrn.com/ sol3 /papers.cfm?abstract_id=9027 l l. 
170. See Sebok, supra note 165, at 1502-04 ( describing the response of the plaintiffs' bar 
to the tort reform movement). 
171. History reveals that the plaintiff's bar is not unique in using this strategy. See John 
Fabian Witt, The Long History cf State Constitutions and American Tort Law, 36 RUTGERS LJ. 
1159, 1196 (2005) ("At different times and in different places, virtually all of the contending 
interest groups in the American tort debates have found themselves advancing constitutional 
arguments against amendments to the existing law of torts."). 
172. But note that the plaintiffs' bar has some conflicting interests that cut against more 
aggressive lobbying to address the main obstacle to damages payouts: judgment-proof 
defendants. See Stephen G. Gilles, 7he]udgment-ProcfSociety, 63 WASH. &LEEL. REV. 603, 
707-09 (2006). 
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capture public regulatory agencies. 
A different set of lawyers has an interest in public law risk regulation. 
There are a large number of private rights of action in public law, both 
created by statute and implied by judicial decisions. 173 For example, almost 
every major federal environmental statute passed since the 1970s contains a 
"citizen suit" clause. 174 Scholars have distinguished between "agency-
forcing" and "enforcing" suits. 175 In an agency-forcing suit, the plaintiff 
"su [es] the government agency charged with implementing the 
environmental laws ... alleg[ing] that an agency has failed in its duties to 
fulfill the mandates" of a statute. 176 In an enforcing suit, the plaintiff 
"typically sues a private corporation that is allegedly violating 
environmental laws or regulations ... thus enforc[ing] the law, when the 
government has been unable or unwilling to do so." 177 
Agency-forcing suits are unlikely to sustain a political economy because 
they are so rare. 178 Enforcing suits are not rare, and they can be self-
sustaining if attorneys' fees are large and predictable enough that lawyers 
have an interest in filing them. They can be socially wasteful, but they can 
also serve important regulatory goals. One of the standard justifications for 
private rights of action is that private litigants will intervene where agencies 
fail to enforce their statutory aims-sometimes because of pressure from 
regulated industry. 179 
B. Empirical Plausibility 
The organized plaintiffs' bar in the United States has a surprising origin 
story. It is descended from lawyers working in a system we now see as the 
alternative to tort law: worker's compensation. 180 In the 1940s, 
"employers' -side lobbies sought to reduce benefit levels, which in turn 
reduced the fees that claimants' lawyers received from their clients in 
173. For examples, see Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation ef Private Eriforcement: The 
Case fer Expanding the Role ef Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 98-106 (2005) 
[hereinafter Stephenson, Private Enforcement]. 
174. Id. at 99. 
175. Frank B. Cross, Rethinking Environmental Citizen Suits, 8 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 
55, 55 (1989); see also Stephenson, Private Eriforcement, supra note 173, at 97 (following this 
distinction). 
176. Cross, supra note 175, at 55. 
177. Id. 
178. See id. at 56 (stating that the "overwhelming majority" of citizen suits are enforcing 
suits). 
179. See Stephenson, Private Eriforcement, supra note 173, at 110. 
180. See Witt, supra note 165, at 264-65. 
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compensation cases." 181 To protect their business model, "a small group of 
claimants' -side workers' compensation lawyers formed an organization 
called the National Association of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys 
(NACCA)," which "fought in the legislature and the state agencies for 
benefit rates and other changes in the workers' compensation system." 182 
The compensation claimants' bar's embrace of the tort system was due 
in part to its susceptibility to interest group politics: 
Within just a few short years, however, NACCA leaders realized that the 
lobbying and networking they were learning to do in their workers' 
compensation practices could be adapted to tort, where it would be 
considerably more lucrative. Notwithstanding its common-law roots, 
legislatures had considerable influence over the law of torts. Moreover, 
courts were subject to the kinds of interest group politics in which the 
NACCA leadership was beginning to participate, especially at the state 
level. 183 
In 1964, NACCA became the Association of Trial Lawyers of America 
(ATLA), now known as the American Association for Justice (AAJ). 184 The 
AAJ is one of the largest donors to state and federal political campaigns. 185 
It is one of the leading opponents of legislation to cap tort damages and 
scale back tort liability. 186 It is also active in state judicial election 
campaigns. 187 
No particular legislative intervention bolstered the interest group power 
of the plaintiffs' bar. Rather, the creation of an organized plaintiffs' bar 
was a byproduct of interest group struggles over the workers' compensation 
system. But this history supports the general point that the financial 
interests of lawyers, and their capacity for organization, can be a powerful 
political force for expanding or sustaining risk regulation. 
There is at least an arguable example of a legislation-created lawyer 
interest group in environmental law. Todd Zywicki claims that the 
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Superfund program, which 
181. Id. at 264. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 265. 
185. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, the American Association for 
Justice (AAJ) was the 16th largest institutional donor to candidates, parties, and political 
action campaigns between 1989 and 2014, donating over $48 million, ranked between 
Goldman Sachs and Contran Corp. CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., Top Organization 
Contlibutors(Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/list.php. 
186. See Sebok, supra note 165, at 1502-04; see also F. Patrick Hubbard, 17ze Nature and 
Impact ef the ('Tort Reform" Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 43 7, 480-83 (2006). 
187. See Champagne, supra note 167, at 1394-96. 
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allows the EPA to sue defendants for the cost of cleaning up hazardous 
waste sites and then allows those defendants to sue others for 
reimbursement, has largely become a vehicle for the interests of the 
hazardous waste industry and its lawyers. 188 He notes that lawyers' groups 
supported its enactment and subsequent expansion and cites evidence that 
contributions of "trial lawyers" to members of Congress significantly 
predicted members' votes for expanding the program. 189 Zywicki thinks 
the Superfund program is socially wasteful, but one need not share his 
evaluation of the program to accept his account of its political economy: 
lawyer interest groups helped create and sustain an environmental program 
that is costly to entrenched interest groups. 
C. Coriflicting Interests 
It may be helpful to distinguish between three different types of 
divergence between a lawyer's interests and the public interest. The first is 
the divergence between a lawyer's interest and her client's interest in a 
particular case. The second is the divergence between a lawyer's interest 
and her client's interest at the level of the dispute resolution system. The 
third is the divergence between her client's interest and the social interest. 
Both create potential obstacles to a virtuous capture strategy based on 
empowering lawyer interest groups, but the latter two are more significant. 
The divergence between a lawyer's interest and her client's interest is 
more familiar and, at least presumptively, more amenable to regulation. 
Relative to their clients, lawyers might have a greater interest in quick 
settlements (if on a contingency fee basis) or on protracted litigation (if on a 
billable hour basis). 190 They might prioritize net financial recovery-and 
thus greater net fees-at the expense of other goods, such as having a day 
in court, avoiding the disclosure of private information, or preserving 
business relationships. But as significant as these conflicts can be, they are 
widely appreciated and heavily regulated by professional responsibility rules 
that are drafted, enacted, and enforced by the legal profession. 
From a public choice perspective, it may be difficult to explain why the 
legal profession, given that it largely self-regulates, has chosen to protect the 
interests of the clients rather than just the interests of its members beyond 
what the need to protect the public reputation of the profession requires. A 
public choice theorist might question whether the practice of professional 
188. See Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: 17ze Political 
Economy ef Environmental Regulation and Reform, 7 3 TUL. L. REV. 84 5, 85 8-60 ( 1999). 
189. See id. at 904. 
190. The incentives that lawyer referral networks create may mitigate the misalignment 
of interests. See Witt, supra note 165, at 274-75. 
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responsibility regulation matches the client-first rhetoric of the codes. But 
the relevant point here is that, whatever the current level of policing of 
conflicts of interests between lawyers and clients, there is not any reason to 
predict that empowering lawyer interest groups would exacerbate the 
divergence between client interests and lawyer interests because lawyers 
already control the means to regulate that divergence. 
Lawyer interests and client interests diverge more dramatically at the 
level of the system of dispute resolution. One would expect clients to prefer 
a system that minimizes costs and expedites recovery and expect lawyers to 
prefer the opposite. Sure enough, the plaintiffs' bar aggressively fought one 
of the most prominent recent efforts to make the tort system more efficient: 
no-fault auto insurance plans. 191 Nora Freeman Engstrom explains, "The 
plaintiffs' bar bitterly and steadfastly opposed no-fault from the start-in 
part, no doubt, because the legislation would wipe out some substantial 
portion of plaintiffs' lawyers' livelihoods." 192 A former ATLA president 
"acknowledge[ed] that lawyers' staunch opposition to [no-fault] plans 
stemmed, in part, from the fact that they 'did not relish the prospect of 
losing 7 5 percent of their business in one fell swoop."' 193 
Engstrom thinks that the "trials-lawyers-killed-it accounts" of the waning 
of no-fault plans is too simple, but she concedes that it gets "much right." 194 
The more general worry it suggests is significant. Lawyer interest groups 
have a general interest in complicated, expensive, and lucrative systems of 
dispute resolution, and any virtuous capture strategy designed to empower 
lawyers must address that conflicting interest. 
Finally, in some instances, clients and lawyers might have a shared 
interest that diverges with the public interest. Clients and lawyers will have 
a financial interest in cases based on technical violations of statutory 
provisions or common law innovations that do not cause firms to 
internalize genuine externalities and do not achieve just distributive 
transfers. There is no simple way to fund lawyer interest groups with the 
condition that they only lobby for justified expansions ofliability. 
D. Prescriptions 
Whether empowering lawyer interest groups is justified as a political 
strategy is a highly case-specific question, and at least three factors are 
191. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, An Alternative Explanation for No-Fault's "Demise", 61 
DEPAULL. REV. 303, 323-25 (2012). 
192. Id. at 323. 
193. Id. 
194. See id. at 309. 
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relevant. First, if the strategy involves empowering a lawyer interest group 
that routinely litigates against parties that are themselves powerful interest 
groups, it is reasonable to worry less that they will be unable to counteract 
lawyer rent-seeking that comes at their expense. This factor weighs in favor 
of empowering specialized segments of the bar-perhaps subsets of the 
plaintiffs' bar or firms representing citizens in enforcing suits-rather than 
broader lawyer interest groups that oppose a diverse set of parties in court. 
Of course, as the Superfund example demonstrates, it is important to 
consider whether litigation that appears like individual plaintiffs versus 
corporate defendants is actually litigation between two different sets of 
powerful commercial interests. 
Second, counter intuitively, empowering lawyer interest groups that 
litigate against the government may be a dubious strategy. Government 
actors do not internalize economic costs as private firms do. 195 An agency 
head does not pay damages out of the agency's budget the way a corporate 
executive might. Instead, governments respond to political costs, and 
paying out damages to lawyers and their clients might be a political benefit, 
not a cost, if the agency is captured. For the government check on abuse to 
work, a lawsuit might need to threaten a reputational cost on a government 
actor with discretionary power. 196 
Third, more speculatively, juries might be a check on unjustified lawyer 
rent-seeking. Even if lawyer interest groups are able to persuade legislators 
to pass socially wasteful legislation and able to defend it from attack in 
appellate courts, they may not be able to procure damages verdicts from lay 
jurors. The jury system certainly has its flaws, but jurors are the rare 
political actors that are insusceptible to pecuniary influence. When 
damages are left to a jury rather than proscribed by statute, the jury's 
common sense aversion to rent-seeking can check against liability for mere 
technical violations. 
VI. CAPTURE CAN BE VIRTUOUS 
Parts III-V argued that using interest groups to pursue regulatory goals 
is feasible. This Part argues that it can be justified. I make two claims. 
First, on plausible assumptions, deliberately increasing the influence of 
certain interest groups so that they will seek regulation for self-interested 
reasons will sometimes be socially utile-to reduce externalities, to improve 
distributional outcomes, and to counteract existing rent-seeking by other 
195. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation ef 
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 354-56 (2000). 
196. Of course, there may be a divergence between the incentives of bureaucrats and 
legislators here. See id. at 380-87. 
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firms. Second, when a particular regulatory policy is normatively desirable, 
manipulating the power and incentives of interest groups is a legitimate 
means to achieve that policy. 
A. Justified Ends 
Part I explained that, according to public choice theory, firms will use 
their interest group power to seek economic rents, payments in excess of the 
market value of an asset. 197 According to one prominent definition, "rent 
seeking is the socially costly pursuit of wealth transfers." 198 This definition 
is potentially misleading. It is possible that, although a firm seeks regulation 
to acquire economic rents, the regulation could be socially utile, 
notwithstanding the firm's costly efforts to procure it. This possibility is 
underappreciated because "nearly all the public choice literature focuses on 
[the] negative consequences of rent seeking." 199 
There are at least three cases that a regulation for which a firm sought 
rents will increase social utility. 20° First, the regulation might increase 
efficiency by compelling other firms to internalize costs that they 
externalize in an unregulated market. Second, the regulation might 
improve distributional outcomes because of the diminishing marginal utility 
of wealth. Third, the regulation might counteract previously existing rent-
seeking of a greater magnitude. 
1. Reducing Negative Externalities 
Firms' rent-seeking interests might be aligned with reducing negative 
externalities. Consider the following stylized hypothetical. Suppose that a 
set of firms was creating a significant externality-say, by emitting large 
quantities of carbon into the atmosphere, altering the climate, and 
ultimately imposing significant costs on others who have not accepted those 
costs in a bargain with the firms. Even the staunchest free market 
enthusiast would acknowledge that, if the facts were as described, 
regulation forcing the firms to internalize those costs would result in a net 
social benefit, especially in the form of a Pigouvian tax. 
Now suppose further that a second set of firms had a strong profit-
197. See MUELLER, supra note 2, at 333-35. 
198. Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 506, 506 
(Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997). This definition is, for example, quoted in Richard L. Hasen, 
Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191,228 (2012). 
199. Cowen et al., supra note 17, at 131. 
200. For a similar argument that rent-seeking is not always socially wasteful, see FARBER 
& FRICKEY, supra note 14, at 34-35. 
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seeking interest in that same regulation-clean energy firms, for example. 
Their reason for supporting the regulation was not that it was socially 
beneficial. Rather, they sought a private benefit: a competitive advantage 
over the firms creating the externality. Suppose this second set of firms 
lobbied for the regulation and succeeded in achieving it. 
This is classic rent-seeking. Under a carbon tax, clean energy plants will 
receive payments in excess of their market value. The clean energy firms 
are using the coercive power of the state to increase their wealth, and they 
have engaged in costly lobbying to acquire that private benefit and likely 
compelled others to engage in costly lobbying to-unsuccessfully-oppose 
them. But, at least on these stylized facts, there will be a net increase in 
social utility, as the social benefit of the new regulation would overwhelm 
the social cost of the lobbying on both sides. 
The result may still hold if the assumptions are relaxed. Suppose, for 
example, the regulation that the firms seek is not a carbon tax, but a less 
efficient clean energy regulation. Suppose further that the only reason that 
the firms are in the position to seek those policies was an earlier, less 
efficient clean energy subsidy. These additional inefficiencies undoubtedly 
reduce social utility compared to a pure carbon tax achieved without an 
earlier subsidy. But a world with an inefficient subsidy leading to lobbying, 
which in turn leads to an inefficient regulation that causes risk-creating 
firms to internalize some of the costs of carbon emissions, is still plausibly 
better off than a world in which the costs of emissions are externalized. 
Relaxing these assumptions suggests that virtuous capture will be 
infrequent, not implausible. The stakes of the regulation need to be 
sufficiently high to justify the costly way in which it will be achieved and the 
inefficiencies that the imperfect alignment between the interests group's 
aims and the public's interests will cause. But when a regulation compels 
firms to internalize significant social costs, the regulation does not become 
socially disutile simply because it also confers economic rents on other 
firms. 
2. Achieving a Fairer Distribution 
Regulations that appear inefficient if utility is equated to dollars may be 
nonetheless socially utile because of the diminishing marginal utility of 
income. 201 It is standard in the law and economics literature to assume that 
201. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
961, 991 (2001) ("Redistributing income from the rich to the poor will tend to raise social 
welfare, assuming that the marginal utility of income is greater for the poor than for the 
rich."). But see Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax Policy, 95 MINN. 
L. REV. 904 (2011) (questioning the diminishing marginal utility of income). 
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the distributional effects of regulation can be ignored because, once the 
efficient rule is determined, any adverse distributional effects can be 
corrected by a transfer through the tax system. 202 The assumption is 
justified on the well-supported ground that the tax system is a more efficient 
means to transfer wealth than legal rules are. 203 
This assumption is extremely useful for the purpose of economic 
analysis. It simplifies what would otherwise be prohibitively complicated 
questions about the utility effects of different legal rules. But the 
assumption is less useful for political analysis. There is no reason to expect 
that, once a legal rule is changed to become more efficient, its adverse 
distributional effects will be offset through tax transfers. The assumption 
that distributional effects can be ignored bleeds into some public choice 
analyses. It is sometimes assumed that if a regulation creates inefficiency in 
dollars, it creates a disutility. However, if there is a diminishing marginal 
utility to income, that assumption is deeply misguided. 
I emphasize the diminishing marginal utility of income argument 
because it is internal to the welfarist analysis. But welfarism is not self-
evidently the best theory of the good. It is plausible that the best normative 
position is not welfarism, but prioritarianism. In the words of its leading 
proponent in the legal academy, "while utilitarianism simply adds up 
individual utilities, prioritarianism gives extra moral weight to well-being 
changes affecting individuals at lower well-being levels." 204 That debate is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 205 W elfarism and prioritarianism converge 
on the view that distributional effects matter; they diverge only on how 
much they matter and why. 
Consider a second hypothetical. Imagine that firms are disposing of 
toxic waste next to a low-income neighborhood, creating risks to its 
residents' health and the nearby environment. Because the residents of the 
neighborhood lack political clout, they are unable to convince the relevant 
legislators to act. Now suppose that a group of enterprising lawyers 
convinces the legislature to enact a statute that creates a cause of action for 
individuals who have been exposed to toxic waste near their residence. 
Then the lawyers, for profit-seeking reasons, approach the residents and 
enlist them as plaintiffs. They sue the risk-creating firms and settle. 
It is easy to see how this sort of rent-seeking might be inefficient. The 
plaintiffs' bar would spend funds lobbying for the law, and the risk-creating 
202. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 201, at 993-94. 
203. For standard citations, see id. at 994 & n.65. 
204. Matthew D. Adler, Future Generations: A Prioritarian View, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
14 78, 1484 (2009). 
205. For a brief argument aimed at motivating prioritarianism, see id. at 1486-87. 
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firms would spend to oppose it. The litigation process itself would be 
expensive, and a third of the damages would go to the lawyers. The cause 
of action might not be narrowly tailored to remedying the injury. The 
statute might not be limited to justified causes of action. 
But the rent-seeking might be justified if it compelled the firms to 
internalize the costs they externalized onto the neighborhood. More subtly, 
this type of legislation and litigation could have distributive effects on future 
decisions about where toxic wastes should be disposed. If lawyer rent-
seeking can help compensate for the political deficit that low income 
communities face, firms would no longer have an incentive to locate risk-
creating facilities in low income neighborhoods. 
The hypothetical is not wholly fictional. There have been a series of 
lawsuits brought by lawyers affiliated with the environmental justice 
movement aimed at redressing environmental harms concentrated on racial 
minorities using the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 206 The primary motivation 
behind these early, risky lawsuits was most likely the lawyers' vision of social 
justice rather than rent-seeking. But there is no obvious reason why 
pecuniary motives, or some combination of motives, could not serve the 
same purpose. 
There is good reason to expect that some rent-seeking might be 
necessary to protect low income citizens from externalized risk. Political 
scientists have amassed voluminous evidence that the political process is 
more responsive to the preferences of affiuent voters, 207 but the more vivid 
reason is historical. For much of the last century, the unique organizational 
strengths of private sector unions gave their members more political power 
than groups oflow-income individuals usually have. Unions behaved much 
like firm interest groups did. They sought legislation and regulation to 
protect their members, like subsidies and barriers to entry. 208 Many 
206. See Julia B. Latham Worsham, Disparate Impact Lawsuits Under Title VI, Section 602: 
Can a Legal Tool Build Environmental Justice?, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 631, 632 (2000). But 
see Nicholas C. Christiansen, Comment, Environmental Justice: Deciphering the Nlaze qf a Private 
Right qf Action, 81 MISS. LJ. 843, 849-51 (2012) (finding that environmental justice litigation 
using the Equal Protection Doctrine historically has largely failed because of high burden of 
proving invidious racial discrimination in facially-neutral statues and regulations). 
207. See e.g., Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 PUB. OPINION Q 
778 (2005). 
208. See, e.g., Donald]. Kochan, Corporate Social Responsibility in a Remerfy-Seeking Society: A 
Public Choice Perspective, l 7 CHAP. L. REV. 413, 445 (2014) ("Public interest-labeled 
groups ... seek to maximize their budgets, maximize influence, maximize membership, 
secure their jobs, and in the case of corporate social responsibility sometimes directly 
effectuate wealth transfers into their organizations or constituencies .... "); Kochan 
mentions "unions" as one of the "public interest-labeled groups" he has in mind. Id. at 443. 
I do not share Kochan's distaste for certain nonprofits, but I accept his positive account. 
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currently existing occupational health and safety regulations are the result 
of union lobbying. 209 
Some politicians deliberately employed and some activists and scholars 
openly defended something like a virtuous capture strategy with unions. 
They sought changes in the law designed to increase the power of unions, 
based on the expectation that more powerful unions would lead to 
legislation favorable to worker interests, including more aggressive 
regulation of worker health or safety. 210 It is possible that other interest 
groups, like differentially risk-creating firms, risk-mitigating firms, insurers, 
and lawyers, can be given the right incentives to fill part of the political 
economy vacuum that the decline of private sector unions has created. 
3. Counteracting Existing Rent-Seeking 
Public choice theory suggests a third justification for new rent-seeking--
counterbalancing existing, more inefficient rent-seeking. Take barriers to 
entry for example. Suppose that incumbent firms have procured a 
regulation that pays them rents by restricting potential new entrants. The 
social costs of that rent-seeking are the incumbent's lobbying expenditures 
and the inefficiency that the regulation creates by making the market less 
than perfectly competitive. Now suppose that, due to a subsidy, a coalition 
of potential new entrants has grown in political power. The new entrants 
start their own lobbying to dislodge the entry barrier. The incumbents 
fight back, but the potential new entrants prevail. 
There is a lot of socially wasteful spending in this hypothetical. First, 
there was the cost of lobbying for the initial subsidy, and the subsidy itself 
may have also been inefficient because there is no reason to assume that the 
level of subsidy needed to achieve the interest groups' effects equals the 
209. See, e.g.,James T. O'Reilly, Driving a Seft Bargain: Unions, Toxic Materials, and Right to 
Know Legislation, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 307, 307 (1985) (noting that unions successfully 
lobbied for state right to know laws concerning toxic materials in the workplace, as well as 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA's) Hazard Communication 
standard); Benjamin Goad, Unions Applaud as OSHA Releases Long-Stalled Worker Sqfety Rule, 
THE HILL (Aug. 23, 2013, 6:28 PM), http://thehill.com/regulation/labor/318543-osha-
releases-long-stalled-worker-safety-rule. See general[y Andrew P. Morriss & Susan E. Dudley, 
Defining JiVhat to Regulate: Silica and the Problem ef Regulatory Categorization, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 
269 (2006) (detailing health effects of silica exposure, options for regulation, and the history 
of advocacy for occupational health standards). 
210. See, e.g., Beverly Gage, Should You Care About the Fate ef Unions?, SLATE (June 30, 2014, 
6:08 PM), http:/ /www.slate.com/ articles/ news_and_politics/history /2014/06/ supreme_ 
court_harris_decision_if_you_care_about_income_inequality_you_should.html; Richard D. 
Kahlenberg & Moshe Z. Marvit, A Civil Right to Unionize, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 29, 2012), 
http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2012/03/01 /opinion/a-civil-right-to-unionize.html. 
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socially optimal level ignoring interest group effects. To this sum should be 
added the cost of the new entrants' lobbying efforts and the cost of 
incumbents to oppose them. This could be an expensive political arms 
race. 211 
But it still might have a positive expected value as a whole. If the 
existing barriers to entry are strongly curbing competition, removing the 
barriers could be enormously valuable. If the new entrants win decisively 
and establish a new equilibrium in the political economy, the long-term 
efficiency gains of the competitive market could outweigh the one-time cost 
of the lobbying. Of course, there is a chance that the new entrants will be 
so successful that they will be able to establish new barriers to entry that are 
tailored to include them yet exclude the next generation of potential 
entrants. But, in the short run, it is difficult to imagine a political coalition 
that is powerful enough to outbid incumbents but selective enough to 
exclude other potential new entrants. 
B. Justified Means 
One could object that, even if the ends of virtuous capture can be 
justified, it is not a normatively permissible means to achieve those ends. 
There are three plausible arguments for why it is an impermissible means. 
First, the strategy defended here might be unjustified because it uses interest 
groups as a means to an end other than their own. Second, it might be 
illegitimate to deliberately manipulate the outcomes of democratic 
processes. Third, the strategy might be objectionable because in some cases 
it relies on deception and fails a test of public reason. 
1. Autonomy 
This Article has defended using interest groups as a means to an end-
the end of achieving public-interested health, safety, and environmental 
regulation. At first glance, the strategy might appear to violate the widely 
shared moral intuition that no person should be used as a means. That 
intuition is famously at the center of Kantian ethical theory. But one need 
not be a Kantian to accept the claim that there should be some side 
constraints on political action and that respecting the autonomy of persons 
is an intuitively compelling side constraint. The Article has def ended both 
211. See Justin Levitt, Co'!fi·onting the Impact efCitizens United, 29 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 
21 7, 218-19 (2010) ( crediting creation of campaign spending arms race as a result of Buckley 
u. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)); Burton A. Abrams & Russell F. Settle, Campaign-Finance Reform: A 
Public Choice Perspective, 120 PUB. CHOICE 379, 379 (2004) (comparing campaign spending to 
an arms race). 
472 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW [67:3 
empowering and altering the incentives of interest groups. These acts may 
seem similar, but for the autonomy objection, they need separate defenses. 
When the strategy calls for empowering interest groups through subsidy, 
the autonomy objection is easily defeated. One can distinguish between 
using an agent as a means and using an agent as a mere means. 212 In 
almost every commercial transaction, there is a literal sense in which we use 
the person with whom we are doing business as a means to our end. 
Riding in a taxi to the airport entails using the driver as a means to the end 
of the voyage, but it does not entail using the driver as a mere means. The 
driver consents to the transaction because it serves his or her purposes-
making a living-as well. Riding in the taxi does not disrespect the driver's 
rational agency. 213 Likewise, the strategy of empowering interest groups 
through subsidy assumes that those groups already have their own profit-
seeking reasons to lobby for the regulation. The interest groups would 
gladly consent to receive additional funding from outsiders with different 
interests in the same regulatory goals. 
When the strategy calls for altering the incentives of interest groups, the 
ethical analysis is more complicated. Take, for example, the argument in 
Part IV that in some cases legislation should require insurance mandates so 
that insurers develop the incentive to lobby for regulation that reduces the 
risks of insureds. Insurers might-if history is a guide-lobby against the 
insurance mandate. In that case, at least before the mandate is enacted, the 
interest groups will not have consented to being used to pursue the 
regulatory goals that they will come to pursue after the mandate goes into 
effect. 
The better response to the objection here is that most commercial 
interest groups-certainly the firms discussed here-are not "persons" in 
the sense that matters ethically. Individual persons-lobbyists, managers, 
corporate boards-make decisions on behalf of their interest groups, but 
they make those decisions, to the extent that the firms' incentives work as 
they are intended, based on what is in the profit interest of the firm. Were 
it not for their employment by the firm, the individual persons making the 
firms' decisions would almost always be indifferent to the outcome of those 
decisions. Of course, because the firm pays their salary, they probably 
would prefer that the firm be profitable, so they would likely disapprove of 
the firm's incentives being altered if the new incentives led to less 
212. To illustrate the distinction between using someone as means versus mere means, I 
rely on the common example of the interaction between a taxi rider and a taxi driver. For a 
different use of the same example, see B. Sharon Byrd & Joachim Hruschka, Kant on "JiVhy 
Must I Keep A{y Promise?", 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 4 7, 52-53 (2006). 
213. Id. at 52. 
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profitability. But the preferences that lobbyists, managers, and corporate 
boards might have in that case would have nothing to do with a firm's 
autonomy. 
This response may not apply to all commercial interest groups. Many 
for-profit firms claim to have a social mission in addition to their economic 
mission, and for some of these firms, the claim is more than a public 
relations strategy. 214 It is conceivable that the individual decisionmakers at 
these firms might actually care about the firm continuing to pursue its social 
mission and might be genuinely outraged that their interest group's 
incentives have been altered so that it is more difficult to fulfill this mission. 
But that scenario is extremely unlikely to occur as a result of a virtuous 
capture strategy, which, by definition, aims to align a firm's interest with-
at least one conception of-the public interest. 
The response would also certainly not apply to all interest groups. For 
many non-commercial interest groups, autonomy is a value worth 
protecting. Consider, for example, the interest group machinations that 
surrounded the New York City Health Department's ill-fated attempt to 
cap the portion sizes of certain sugary drinks. 215 The beverage industry, 
which opposed the cap, responded in part with an unconventional interest 
group strategy: they sought to portray the regulation on sugary drinks as 
having a disproportionate negative effect on minority groups. To make 
that argument, they enlisted the help of activist groups that represented 
minority communities and funded them generously. 216 Some have argued 
that the beverage industry effectively bribed or co-opted the minority 
groups. 217 Others have been skeptical that the groups were genuinely co-
opted.218 Both sides agree that the portion cap would have 
disproportionately affected minority consumers. 219 
214. See generally Jenny Mish & Debra L. Scammon, Principle-Based Stakeholder Marketing: 
lnsightsfrom Private Triple-Bottom-Line Firms, 29]. PUB. POL. &MARKETING 12 (2010). 
215. For a brief explanation of the proposed regulation, see In re NY. Statewide Coal. ef 
Hispanic Chambers ef Commerce v. NY. Ciry Dep't ef Health & Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d 538, 
541-42 (2014). 
216. See, e.g., Nancy Huehnergarth, How Big Soda Co-opted the NAACP and Hispanic 
Federation, BUFFINGTON POST Gan. 25, 2013, 8:48 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
I nancy-huehnergarth/minorities-soda-lobby _b_254 l l 2 l .html. 
217. See id. 
218. Rick Cohen, Lessonsfrom the NAACP's Public Opposition to New York Ciry's Big Soda Ban, 
NONPROFIT Q (Mar. 21, 2013, 1:42 PM), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/policysocial-
context/22000-lessons-from-the-naacp-s-public-opposition-to-new-york-city-s-big-soda-
ban.html. 
219. Michael M. Grynbaum & Marjorie Connelly, 60% in Ciry Oppose Bloomberg's Soda 
Ban, Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/23/ 
nyregion / most-new-yorkers-oppose-bloombergs-soda-ban .html? _r=0. 
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The normative analysis of these decisions is complex. It could be that 
the beverage industry's contributions to minority activist groups had no 
causal role in those groups' leader's decisions to oppose the portion cap. 
But at least one plausible interpretation of the situation suggests that the 
beverage industry sought to use minority interest groups to advance their 
regulatory agenda and that their strategy to achieve this goal was to fund 
the minority groups, so as to create an incentive for those groups to publicly 
oppose the portion size cap. 
If that interpretation is accurate, the beverage industry's manipulation of 
minority interest groups might be an objectionable use of an interest group 
as a means to an end. The fact that the minority groups appeared to 
cooperate with the beverage industry voluntarily might not be a full 
defense, if they ( 1) only made the decision to oppose the cap because of the 
money and (2) we accept that this case is· distinguishable from the case of 
the taxi driver, because the minority groups' public positions should not be 
transactional. 
But this example reinforces why using interest groups is innocuous when 
the groups are for-profit firms, insurers, and lawyers. For-profit firms' 
public political positions are, almost by definition, transactional-taken to 
serve their profit-seeking interests. Thus, even deliberately altering the 
political incentives of these firms against their protest might be a 
normatively permissible means to achieve otherwise desirable ends. 
2. Democratic Legitimacy 
Virtuous capture might also be criticized from the perspective of political 
philosophy. Even if the strategy does not violate anyone's autonomy, it 
might violate the principles that we take to constrain legitimate political 
activity in a democracy. There are three plausible versions of this 
objection. First, one could object that legislators should never support 
legislation based on its political effects rather than on what makes good 
policy. Second, one could object that, even if legislators can legitimately 
consider political effects as part of what constituted "good policy," those 
political effects should not be based on financial incentives-what critics 
call legalized bribery. Third, one could object that, even if legislators can 
support legislation that will appeal to the financial interests of the majority, 
they should not support legislation because it will appeal to the financial 
interests of a powerful minority. 
To be clear, any of these versions of this normative theory of democracy 
might seem like idealistic fantasies to a thoroughgoing public choice 
theorist. If all politicians act solely to maximize their chances of reelection, 
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as public choice theory claims, any theory that requires them to have other 
motivations fails the maxim that "ought implies can." The democratic 
legitimacy objection only has some traction here because this Article rejects 
the radical version of public choice theory and def ends a strategy that 
depends on the possibility that some political actors might have ideological 
motivations-that is, motivations based on their conception of the public 
interest. The democratic legitimacy objection comes from the opposite 
direction of radical public choice theory. It is an argument that politicians 
should be even more constrained in acting on those public-interested 
motivations than the Article recommends. 
The vision of democracy that posits that legislators should support or 
oppose legislation based on whether it is good policy is intuitively 
appealing. There is a longstanding debate about whether legislators should 
be delegates-for whom "good policy" is defined by what the legislator's 
constituents think is good policy-or trustees-for whom "good policy" is 
defined by what the legislator herself thinks is good policy. 220 But the 
debate presumes that someone's sincere policy preferences, their 
conception of the public interest, should be decisive. Legislative 
compromises may be necessary, but legislators should only support 
compromises if the compromise is, on balance, an improvement from the 
status quo policy. 
One challenge to this view is what it suggests about whether legislators 
should sometimes support legislation that they or their constituents believe 
to be bad policy, but that will help their reelection. If one concedes that 
voting for bad policies to increase one's electoral chances-and thereby 
enhancing one's ability to pursue good policies in the future-is acceptable, 
then it should not be objectionable to support legislation based on 
predictions about how that legislation will have good political effects other 
than one's own reelection that will lead to good policies in the future. But 
the objector could bite the bullet here and insist that increasing one's 
chances of reelection is not a permissible reason to support bad policy. 
Then the only response available is to question whether political effects 
should never be part of a good policy. There is no knockdown normative 
argument for the view that good political effects should be considered part 
of good policy. But there are at least some examples of widely admired 
policies from history that were designed in part to have political effects. 
220. For a modern expansion of the delegate and trustee theories of representation, see 
Andrew Rehfeld, Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and Gyroscopes in the Study ef 
Political Representation and Democracy, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 214 (2009) (describing a "typical" 
pure delegate or pure trustee legislator and establishing eight possible variants of delegates or 
trustees by determining their aims, sources from which they draw to make decisions, and 
responsiveness to sanctions such as re-election). 
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The most high-profile examples are Social Security and Medicare. 221 One 
standard policy justification for these programs is their distributive effect. 222 
They provide, respectively, income support and health insurance to the 
elderly, who may be unable to rely on market employment. Both of these 
programs probably could be made more efficient by introducing some 
means-testing. There is no good "policy" rationale for transferring money 
to wealthy seniors, who can use their assets or savings for income and to 
pay for health insurance. 
Yet, means-testing would undermine the political economy of Social 
Security and Medicare. They are two of the most popular government 
programs, 223 and few politicians from either mainstream party will openly 
suggest significant cuts to these programs, or at least cuts that would affect 
current beneficiaries. 224 The attractive political economy of these programs 
is not a coincidence. The architects of both programs knew that making 
every person over a certain age eligible for benefits would help to ensure a 
broad self-sustaining political constituency that included middle and high 
income individuals, opposing any future cuts. 
This lesson is not lost on today's politicians. It is no coincidence that the 
two of the first provisions of the Affordable Care Act to come into effect 
were the prohibition on health insurers discriminating against those with 
pre-existing conditions and the requirement that children be allowed to 
remain on their parents' health insurance policies until twenty-six. 225 Much 
of the ACA is redistributive, 226 but these two provisions benefit middle- and 
high-income individuals and thus help cement political support for the 
ACA.221 
221. See, e.g., Patricia E. Dilley, Through the Doughnut Hole: Reimagining the Social Securif:Y 
Contribution and Benefit Base Limit, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 367, 368, 381 & n.40(2010). 
222. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. 
REV. 1431, 1448 (1986). 
223. For example, in a 2011 poll, 88 percent of Americans stated that Medicare has 
been "good" or "very good" for the country, and 87 percent stated likewise for Social 
Security. See THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER, GOP DIVIDED OVER BENEFIT REDUCTIONS: 
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Now, one could distinguish Social Security, Medicare, and the ACA 
from the interventions that this Article defends on the ground that the 
political effects in those laws were designed to create a political economy 
that would sustain them rather than one that would lead to new laws in the 
future. But it is not clear why that distinction should matter. Both involve 
influencing how future legislators will act by changing political incentives. 
There is no obvious normative asymmetry between repealing an existing 
program and initiating a new one. 
Again, these appeals to existing legislation do not necessarily off er a 
normative reason to accept that considering political effects can be a part of 
deciding on what is "good policy." But, if one shares the intuition that the 
political strategies behind Social Security, Medicare, and the ACA were a 
legitimate part of what made them "good policy" decisions, the strategies 
defended here should benefit from that intuition as well. 
The entitlement program examples also def eat the second version of the 
democratic legitimacy objection-the version that says that legislators can 
support legislation based in part on its political effects, but not if doing so 
involves appealing to financial incentives. Undoubtedly, many voters 
support Social Security, Medicare, and the ACA because they believe those 
laws benefit the public interest. But they also directly benefit the financial 
interest of the majority. At a minimum, that is the motivation to which the 
architects of these programs intended to appeal. 228 They would have been 
happy to create broad ideological support for the programs, but they knew 
they could at least appeal to voters' pocketbooks. 
The third version of the democratic legitimacy objection avoids this 
response. One could believe that influencing future political 
decisionmaking by appealing to the financial interests of the majority is 
legitimate, but not by appealing to the financial interests of a powerful 
minority. Yet the mere fact that a minority stands to benefit from a law 
rather than a majority is generally not considered objectionable. It is 
plausible that the intensity of a voter's preference should matter just as 
much as the quantity of voters who share that preference matters. 229 It 
poll finding that while only 13 percent of Americans favored retaining the Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) unchanged and 51 percent favored retaining the ACA with modifications, 65 
percent of Americans (and 62 percent of Republicans) favor keeping the ban on denials 
based on pre-existing conditions, and 73 percent of Americans favor keeping the 
requirement that insurance companies allow children up to age twenty-six to stay on their 
parents' insurance plans). 
228. See Jacobs, supra note 226, at 621. 
229. See Elhauge, supra note 12, at 64-65 (arguing that a group's revealed intensity of 
preference is just as· plausible for evaluating the outcomes of the political process as other 
normative baselines). 
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might be desirable, for example, that affirmative action policies confer 
benefits on minorities, even if those benefits come at the expense of the 
milder preferences of a larger group.230 
Appealing to the financial interests of a minority should not be any 
different from appealing to other interests they have. Powerful minorities 
need not be affiuent ones. Consider again the example of unions. 
Empirical research indicates that, "among the interest groups operating in 
the United States today, the strongest positive associations between the 
groups' policy positions and the preferences of the less well-off are found in 
labor unions."231 Unions have organizational advantages-close 
interpersonal relationships, shared experiences, and a common identity 
among others-that compensate for their members' limited resources. 232 
As discussed above, one argument for empowering unions is that they 
will have a long-run incentive to support legislation and regulation that will 
protect worker interests. Most unions, of course, were and are not simply 
ideological groups. They aim to, and have a financial incentive to, protect 
the financial and other interests of their members. Thus, this widely 
accepted argument about supporting unions is essentially an argument that 
legislators should consider ( 1) the political effects of legislation that would 
appeal to the (2) financial incentives of a (3) minority interest. 
This argument about why unions should be supported is not totally 
uncontroversial, and empowering unions is likely not a viable strategy 
today. Private sector unionism has dramatically declined in the past several 
decades-"From a peak of thirty-five percent in the mid- l 950s, unions now 
represent less than seven percent of private sector workers."233 But if it was 
legitimate to empower or alter the incentives of unions so that they would 
protect the interests of workers, it should be legitimate today to empower or 
alter the incentives of other interest groups to achieve regulatory goals. 
CONCLUSION 
Capture is usually, as it is generally understood to be, a vice; however, 
that the typical case of rent-seeking is unjustified entails nothing about 
whether all cases of rent-seeking are unjustified. In fact, the more one 
believes that existing legislation and regulation is the product of unjustified 
rent-seeking, the more likely it is that there exist opportunities for justified 
230. See id. at 50-51 (suggesting this example). 
231. Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbundled Union: Politics Without Collective Bargaining, 123 
YALE LJ. 148, 168 (2013) ( quotations and brackets omitted). 
232. See id. at 171-76. 
233. Id. at 154. 
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rent-seeking to counteract it. 
The public choice critique of legislation and regulation demands that 
scholars take seriously the role of politics in law. But its positive claims do 
not necessarily prescribe any particular normative strategy. The insights of 
public choice theory, refined by the objections of its critics, may provide the 
basis for a political strategy that many public choice theorists would reject. 
There is-or should be-nothing wrong with that: arguments are not 
fiduciaries to their creators. 
The question of whether a virtuous capture strategy will be justified is 
contingent-both on whether the ultimate regulation at which the strategy 
aims is normatively desirable and whether the strategy is likely to succeed. 
This Article has aimed to show that, at least in some cases, the answer to 
both questions is yes. 
